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Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights,
Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication
Suzanne B. Goldberg

Abstract

Judicial opinions typically rely on facts about a social group to justify or reject
limitations on group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about
the status or capacity of group members are in contest. Yet the fact based approach to decision making obscures the normative judgments that actually determine whether restrictions on individual rights are reasonable. This article offers
an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts by focusing on
facts rather than declaring norms. In part, it argues that this approach preserves
judicial flexibility to retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’
rights in some settings but not others without having to explain the inconsistent
treatment of group related norms. The consequences of the fact based decision
making fiction appear strikingly in many contemporary same sex marriage cases,
where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid reconciling gay couples’
exclusion from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual orientation-based
differences as legally insignificant. In that light, the article tests the costs and benefits of greater candor regarding the normative underpinnings of decisions.
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neutral in
public debates by sustaining traditional norms when views about social groups are
in contest. It argues that this position, like the judicial embrace of fact-based decision making, rests on the same flawed premise that restrictions on social groups
can be evaluated based on facts alone. Our theories of judicial review will be
better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the
extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making normative
judgments about social groups.

Constitutional Tipping Points:
Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication
By Suzanne B. Goldberg1
Judicial opinions typically rely on “facts” about a social group to justify or reject limitations on
group members’ rights, especially when traditional views about the status or capacity of group
members are in contest. Yet the fact-based approach to decision-making obscures the normative
judgments that actually determine whether restrictions on individual rights are reasonable. This
article offers an account of how and why courts intervene in social conflicts by focusing on facts
rather than declaring norms. In part, it argues that this approach preserves judicial flexibility to
retain traditional justifications for restricting group members’ rights in some settings but not others
without having to explain the inconsistent treatment of group-related norms. The consequences of
the fact-based decision-making fiction appear strikingly in many contemporary same-sex marriage
cases, where courts treat procreative facts as decisive and avoid reconciling gay couples’ exclusion
from marriage with other decisions that treat sexual orientation-based differences as legally
insignificant. In that light, the article tests the costs and benefits of greater candor regarding the
normative underpinnings of decisions.
The article also challenges the claim that courts can and should remain neutral in public debates by
sustaining traditional norms when views about social groups are in contest. It argues that this
position, like the judicial embrace of fact-based decision-making, rests on the same flawed
premise that restrictions on social groups can be evaluated based on facts alone. Our theories of
judicial review will be better off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to
the extent they recognize the inevitable involvement of courts in making normative judgments
about social groups.
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Courts . . . do not sit or act in a social vacuum. . . . . [W]hat once was a “natural” and
“self-evident” ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on
human potential and freedom.2
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between
male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our
history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white.3
I. Introduction
How do we measure tipping points in constitutional litigation? More specifically,
how do courts decide whether traditionally accepted views of social groups have
transformed, as a result of societal change, into impermissible justifications for restricting
group members’ rights?4 In addressing these questions, this article has two aims: The
2
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
3
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4
By social groups, I simply mean clusters of individuals that are treated by the surrounding community as
comprising an independently identifiable group based on a shared characteristic or practice. The
“particular social group” category in asylum law, which is one of five grounds on which individuals who
have a well-founded fear of persecution can seek asylum, helps illuminate the social group concept as I use
it here. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (describing particular social group
membership as defined by a shared characteristic “that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences”),
overruled in part on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
While the definition of social group might be construed more broadly to encompass groups linked
by occupation (e.g., lawyers, opticians, pushcart vendors) or other interests as much as groups linked by
traits that are arguably more deeply rooted, my focus here is on groups that are conventionally viewed as
making civil rights-based claims and as having the sort of connection identified in Matter of Acosta. These
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first is to advance our understanding of how courts intervene in conflicts regarding
popular views of social groups. The second is to challenge the widely held view that
courts can and should minimize the invasiveness of judicial intervention by sustaining the
status quo when views about social groups are in contest.
The current wave of litigation by gay and lesbian couples seeking to marry
prompts the inquiry here, as these cases saliently illustrate the tensions associated with
adjudicating challenges to longstanding norms regarding social groups. At this moment,
judges around the United States are deciding whether the rationales traditionally accepted
to justify excluding gay couples from marriage should now be understood, in light of
changing social views, to reflect impermissible hostility rather than legitimate
government interests. Some have found it “eminently rational for the Legislature to
postpone making fundamental changes to [the different-sex couple requirement for
marriage] until such time as there is unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus,
or both, that such changes can safely be made.”5 Others, by contrast, have concluded that
prohibiting gay couples from marrying “cannot plausibly further” a state’s aim of

groups include people of color, women, people with mental retardation, and lesbians and gay men, among
others. Cf. Robert Cover, Origin of Judicial Activism, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1299 (1982) (describing a
common conceptualization of minorities as groups “deemed to have a common element of dominating
significance, observable in social structure and social process as they affect politics”). Still, the positive
and normative accounts set out below likely also would have relevance to adjudication of constitutional
claims brought by groups affiliated by “some common impulse or interest.” See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (characterizing a particular social group as “a collection of people
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest”).
For discussion of the relationship of social groups to social movements, see Tomiko BrownNagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436,
1488-1527 (2005). For social science perspectives on the concept of social group, see, e.g., STEREOTYPES
AS EXPLANATIONS: THE FORMATION OF MEANINGFUL BELIEFS ABOUT SOCIAL GROUPS (Craig McGarty et
al. eds., 2002).
5
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting); see also
Samuels v. New York State Dept. of Health, 2006 WL 346465, at **6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006);
Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 360-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875
A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
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“ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing” in light of changing demographics and
laws recognizing that “people in same-sex couples may be ‘excellent’ parents.”6
A similar pattern exists in federal civil rights litigation where claims are made that
once-acceptable views regarding sex, race, and other characteristics have become
destabilized as a consequence of societal change. In these cases, parallel questions arise
regarding whether the traditional justifications remain legitimate bases for different
treatment.
Yet even if we assume that courts stay roughly within the parameters of
acceptable change set by the broader society,7 we are left to wonder how courts
assimilate changing views about social groups and simultaneously avoid being perceived
as unduly usurping the legislature’s prerogative to reflect the people’s will.8 While this

6

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-63 (majority opinion); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005), rev’d 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005); Hernandez, 805
N.Y.S.2d at 389-90 (Saxe, J.P., dissenting); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289-90 (Collester, J., dissenting). One
other court, the Vermont Supreme Court, sought to temper its rejection of the traditional exclusion of samesex couples from marriage by authorizing the legislature to remedy the state constitutional violation. See
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). The Legislature ultimately adopted a civil union statute that
provided parity of rights and benefits within Vermont for gay and non-gay couples. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1201 (2000). For a defense of this type of balancing approach, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004).
7
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606
(“[J]udicial decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people,”); Robert C. Post, The
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”). See
also Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. Dooley’s
dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems no less apt today than
when it was first printed almost a century ago.”). Although the received wisdom may be acknowledged
broadly, the question whether the dialectic relationship between courts and society is desirable remains
contentious, especially in originalist quarters. See generally SCOTT D. BERGER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999) (describing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence as aiming to
discern and apply the framers’ original principles).
8
One could argue that the operative category here is better characterized not as social groups but as issues
or conduct. After all, the perceived link among group members may be common conduct or shared
sensibilities or capacities that differentiate group members from others. Further, normative judgments
about group members tend to inform normative judgments about members’ conduct and capacity and vice
versa. Thus, the distinction between popular views about a group and views about issues or conduct related
to that group is often fuzzy, at best. The dominant tradition of regulating conduct as a means of regulating
group members exacerbates this lack of clarity. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)
(recognizing that Texas’s regulation of “homosexual conduct” impacted the rights of lesbians and gay
men). Indeed, a significant line of equal protection jurisprudence is occupied with the question whether
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concern is a perennial one for courts, the relative finality of constitutional adjudication
heightens it in ways that statutory interpretation and common law adjudication do not.9
The existing scholarship on judicial review goes a step further than the received
wisdom regarding the close relationship between judicial analysis and prevailing social
views by not only recognizing the tension embedded in the judicial role in these kinds of
cases but also advancing normative arguments for its mitigation. Popular
constitutionalists, who reject judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation,
contend that courts lack both the accountability and competence to constitutionalize
determinations about contested social issues such as the exclusion of gay couples from

regulation that is arguably conduct-based actually reflects impermissible sentiment regarding a social
group. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Because group members bear the brunt of regulation—whether the
regulation explicitly targets conduct or a trait, I find the social group category most useful for getting at the
process by which courts absorb social change related to subpopulations and the issues affiliated with them.
Admittedly, the fit is not perfect. I flag below places where the risk of slippage is greatest and where a
focus on issues rather than groups might be the better analytic lens.
More broadly, the focus here on change involving social groups and related issues is but one
dimension of a larger conversation about the relationship between courts and societal change. The
common law, for example, has long embodied the expectation that courts will take account of change in
developing legal principles. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (“[T]he common law is
not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”); see also GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3-4 (1982) (describing common law courts as the
“principal instruments” for “balanc[ing] the need for continuity and change”). Likewise, strong arguments
have been advanced that courts should take societal change into account in statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
The claims here likely have some application to adjudication in non-constitutional settings as well
as to constitutional adjudication involving changes to attitudes, practices, and technology that are not
related directly to social groups. Certainly, the concept of fact-based adjudication developed here seems to
carry over to other areas. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862-64 (1992) (discussing the
reliance on shifting conceptions of fact during and after the Lochner era). See also Alafair S. Burke, Lee:
Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043,
1048, 1052-53 (2005) (discussing the ways in which empirical observations are shaped by normative views
of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
9
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 4 (“The incremental nature of common law adjudication means
that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over time and
in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the
Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
16 (1995) (“There is of course a ‘critical difference’ between when courts make constitutional law and
when they make common law. Outside the area of constitutional adjudication, state court decisions ‘are
subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute. The court is standing in for the legislature, and if it has
done so in a way the legislature does not approve, it can soon be corrected.’ But when a case is decided on
constitutional grounds, the court solidifies the law in ways that may not be as susceptible to subsequent
modification either by courts or by legislatures.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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marriage.10 Others argue that, rather than categorical judicial restraint, the common law
approach of “rational traditionalism,” can and should guide judicial review.11 This
approach, as articulated by David Strauss, would require courts to “think twice about . . .
judgments of right and wrong when they are inconsistent with what has gone before” and
move incrementally, in most instances, rather than breaking sharply with longstanding
traditions.12 Robert Post has offered still another approach, invoking Louis Brandeis to
suggest the centrality of “practical tact and judgment” to preserve legal authority.13
Even these arguments, however, offer only general observations about and
recommendations for judicial decision-making when the surrounding societal terrain is in
contest. This article aims to provide a more rigorous, specific account of the process by
which courts “tip” from one understanding of a social group and its constitutional claims
to another by unearthing and critiquing the structural features of adjudication where
views regarding social groups are, or have been, in flux.
The core claim made here is that while courts14 are very much engaged in
absorbing, evaluating, and responding to changes in popular norms regarding social
groups,15 they proceed in their decision-making by focusing on facts about group

10

See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional
Choice, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1557 (2002).
11
See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
12
Id. at 896-97. Strauss adds that rejection of tradition is justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently
confident that we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.” Id. at 897.
13
Post, supra note 7, at 109.
14
Although the discussion below focuses heavily on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, much of the
analysis and some of the discussion apply to state courts and lower federal courts as well.
15
This analysis rests on the belief that constitutional adjudication involves a “gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. Louisiana, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). The decisions below
demonstrate this evolutionary theory’s descriptive validity and set the foundation for my scrutiny of how
social groups fit within the evolutionary process. A normative defense of constitution adjudication as an
evolving process rather than as fixed and determined exclusively by text and/or history is beyond the scope
here.
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members and leaving normative judgments about group members unmentioned.16
Through this process, which I term fact-based adjudication, courts cite “new” or “newly
understood” facts as the reason for revising the constitutional rights of group members.
Alternately, they reject arguments to change the status quo by opining that facts either
have not changed or have not changed sufficiently to warrant a new constitutional
analysis. Yet, typically, they do not acknowledge the normative judgments about group
members that shape both their factual perceptions and legal reasoning, particularly where
popular views about a social group are contested. Only after an initial foray (or series of
forays) through fact-based cases do courts acknowledge the normative judgments about
group members that were implicit in earlier decisions. This adjudicative method has a
variety of consequences for judicial review of social change-based claims – both positive
and negative – that I explore below.
Numerous cases illustrate the operation of this fact-based approach to
adjudication involving social groups. Consider, for example, the Court’s determination
that “modern knowledge” of race discrimination’s harmful effects required invalidation
of school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.17 Although Brown is widely
treated as having established the normative impermissibility of racial segregation, the
Court’s opinion did not actually discuss, much less condemn, societal norms regarding
the inferiority of African Americans that had previously justified race-based distinctions
in education. The Court’s recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger18 also highlights the

16

As will be explained shortly, see infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text, the distinction between fact
and norm is drawn here for heuristic purposes rather than to suggest a fundamental difference between the
two.
17
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
18
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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judicial inclination toward fact-based analysis when social norms are in contest.19 There,
the normative value of affirmative action as a remedy for past racial discrimination
remained unmentioned. Instead, the Court relied on the factual benefits of diversity to
justify the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in admissions.20
Judicial approaches to sex equality in the early 1970s likewise were framed in
terms of “new” or changed facts requiring a break with the past normative view that
women were less capable in the public sphere than men. Yet even as facts about the
capacity of women relative to men were treated as decisive,21 the decisions
unquestionably forged new normative ground.
Romer v. Evans, which invalidated a Colorado amendment barring
antidiscrimination protections for gay people, also was cast as a fact-driven decision.22
While affirming the general constitutional norm that government may not act based on
animus toward unpopular groups, the Court refused to address the normative judgment
specific to gay people – “moral disapproval of homosexuality” – that the dissent
proffered to show the reasonableness of Colorado’s restriction. Instead, the majority
pinned its holding on the lack of factual connection between Colorado’s ban and the
government’s alleged interests in protecting associational freedom and scarce
governmental resources.23

19

Affirmative action arguably is better characterized as implicating popular views of an issue rather than a
social group. See supra note 7. But see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirmative Action and Colorblindness From
the Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009 (2004) (discussing ways in which views of race shape views
of affirmative action).
20
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33. See infra text accompanying notes 100-104.
21
See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.
22
517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996).
23
Id. Admittedly, the Court not only disregarded norms specific to gay people but also left factual
perceptions of gay people largely unmentioned, hinging its decision instead on more generic facts
concerning the lack of fit between a ban on antidiscrimination laws and the government’s interests in
preserving associational freedom and safeguarding scarce resources. See infra text accompanying notes
54-57, 109-112. Still, because it applied a general antidiscrimination norm to a specific social group
without ever acknowledging the normative judgments regarding the social group that were implicit in its
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While this fact-based decision-making strategy has many appeals, which will be
developed below, its theoretical foundations are shaky, at best. After all, facts alone do
not supply the judgment necessary to decide whether a legal burden on a social group is
reasonable. As David Hume famously put the point, an “ought” cannot be derived from
an “is.”24 The fact that women tend to have primary childcare responsibilities, for
example, does not itself determine whether a law that distinguishes between men and
women is reasonable. Instead, courts charged with evaluating sex-based restrictions must
make normative judgments about the relevance of gendered childcare roles or other
(purported) factual differences between men and women. The same is true for evaluation
of restrictions on other social groups. That courts focus on facts and leave normative
judgments unmentioned obscures but does not eliminate the influence of social norms on
both analysis and outcomes.25
The pervasiveness of fact-based adjudication, with its fictional premise and its
related obfuscation of normative judgments about group members,26 prompts several
questions about the ways in which courts react to constitutional claims by social groups.
What, exactly, is the relationship between facts and norms regarding social group
members in constitutional adjudication? Why does a fact-based approach to adjudication
dominate where norms about social groups are in contest? What can we learn from it
opinion, Romer reinforces the judicial preference for avoiding articulation of norms related to social groups
when those norms are in contest.
24
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (Book III, Part I, Section I) (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1739).
25
This form of reasoning from fact directly to judgment, without analysis of the norms at issue, allows for
incompletely theorized decisions as well as the operation of inchoate, unconscious, or ill-formulated norms,
as will be discussed infra. For extended discussion of undertheorized decisions, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
26
This is not to suggest that courts avoid articulating norms altogether. In any constitutional challenge to a
restriction on individual rights, a norm that government action be reasonable or non-arbitrary, at least, is
always stated. Instead, my interest is in how courts assess whether restrictions on social groups violate
these general norms. My contention is, again, that while these determinations requires judgment about the
social group in question, courts regularly hold out facts about the group as determinative of the restriction’s
reasonableness and leave the judgments about the group unspoken.

9
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

about the factors that influence judicial responses to constitutional adjudication regarding
social group members? What does this approach suggest for advocates and courts
enmeshed in social change litigation? And, finally, what would be the benefits, and
costs, of displacing fact-based adjudication with a commitment to judicial candor
regarding the social group-related norms underlying decisions?
The remainder of this article will explore these questions in the context of
constitutional adjudication where popular views about the status and capacity of social
group members are contested. Before sketching the article’s claims regarding each of
these questions, a preliminary caveat is in order. While separating facts from norms is
useful heuristically for purposes of identifying a significant judicial decision-making
dynamic,27 the distinction should not be overstated. Facts, as well as norms, are
inevitably theory soaked and socially constructed.28 Like the difference between law and
fact, the distinction between norms and facts “does not imply the existence of static, polar
opposites. Rather, [norms and facts] have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and
relative stability on a continuum of experience.”29 Put another way, “because the
positions people take reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews, disputes over [facts]

27
Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985) (“In our legal
system, the categories [of law and fact] have functioned as crucially important constructs that permit us to
understand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience.”). For useful and fascinating
accounts of the concept of fact, see MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF
KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998) and BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF
FACT: ENGLAND, 1550-1720 (2000).
Jurgen Habermas has explored a different dimension of the relationship between fact and norm at
length as it relates to the status and legitimacy of law. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND
NORM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
28
See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
From Gender, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (making this point with respect to the treatment of sex as fact
and gender as norm); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 650-53 (2002) (discussing the occasional recognition by courts of
the socially constructed nature of facts).
29
Monaghan, supra note 27, at 233.
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are in essence ‘the product of an ongoing debate about the ideal society.’”30 Yet while
the two are inevitably interrelated, courts invest a great deal of significance in the
perceived boundary between them. Through interrogating the judicial reification of this
boundary, we can begin to demystify and critique the process by which courts absorb
change in the surrounding society.
In Part II, I lay the groundwork for this analysis by mapping the fact-based
approach to adjudication of constitutional claims by social group members. Part III
elaborates the operation of fact-based adjudication in contested normative arenas. The
discussion first explores the judicial inclination to focus on “new” facts about the social
group at issue while leaving normative underpinnings of decisions unacknowledged. I
then show how fact-based decisions accrete to form the foundation for later cases in
which norm shifts are acknowledged openly. Against this background, Part IV considers
the role of social science and social movements within the fact-based adjudication model.
Part V takes up the theoretical inquiry into why courts tend to respond societal
change by focusing on facts rather than on shifting normative judgments about group
members. While legal process, legal realist, and socio-psychological frames each lend
important insights, I argue that fact-based adjudication also must be understood as
serving judges’ institutional interests by minimizing constraints on future decision
making. By avoiding identification of underlying norms concerning group members,
courts issuing fact-based opinions retain freedom to engage with future cases on factual
grounds and reduce the likelihood that stare decisis principles will require the norm

30

Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149,
154 (2006) (citation omitted). Yet, as Kahan and Braman have also observed, “[i]nstead of challenging one
another’s worldviews, those who continue the debate simply challenge one another’s honesty and
integrity.” Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of GunRisk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1321 (2003). Within this article’s frame, their point reinforces
the argument here that normative conflicts play out in empirical debates.
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reflected in earlier decisions to be carried over into the new case. The risk of normative
overcommitment, in other words, is eliminated or substantially diminished.31 For
example, the early women’s rights cases recognized women’s equality to men by
reference to women’s experience with estate administration32 or facts related to women’s
workforce participation33 but did not announce a norm of sex equality, thereby preserving
room for the Court to test and refine its commitment to sex equality over time.
Part VI evaluates the benefits and costs that would flow from greater judicial
candor regarding the normative judgments about social groups that are inevitably
embedded in constitutional adjudication. While recognizing numerous advantages to
greater candor, I conclude that full exposure of underlying norms would not necessarily
be desirable as a general rule, even if it were possible. So long as decisions are factcentered and uncommitted to particular normative judgments regarding the significance
of those social group facts, room remains for legislatures to move incrementally and for
extrajudicial sources, including social science and social movements, to heighten their
influence on social norms as well as on perceptions of fact.
At the same time, however, unqualified acceptance of the fiction that facts alone
can account for decisions to sustain or reject challenges to restrictions on group
members’ rights has serious costs. Absent pressure to acknowledge the normative
judgments inherent in judicial opinions, courts remain free to avoid explaining the
continued force of negative norms about a social group in some contexts but not others.
For example, without free reign for fact-based decision-making, courts adjudicating
marriage cases could not proceed as though they were in uncharted territory when
31

While normative overcommitment can also be avoided by establishing narrow norms, the discussion
below illustrates the relative difficulty of doing so. See infra text accompanying notes 200-202. Even
narrowed norms require a level of explicitly normative defense that fact-based decisions avoid.
32
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 105-108.
33
See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see also infra note 117.
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considering whether differences between same- and different-sex couples justify
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. While greater candor would not compel
particular outcomes in these cases, it would require acknowledgment and distinction of
the many instances in which differences between gay and non-gay people are not treated
as relevant in related contexts, such as custody, visitation, and second-parent adoption.
Stepping back, we can see that whether courts affirm or reject tradition, rulings on
social group claims involve selections among norms about groups even when those
normative positions remain unarticulated. When courts reject arguments by social groups
that traditional justifications for discriminatory laws are no longer valid, their decisions
must be understood as strengthening the claim of the traditional norm, and not as neutral
avoidance of the public debate. Once stripped of the cover of the fact-based adjudication
fiction, it becomes clear that affirmation of tradition is thus neither a neutral nor a noninvasive approach to judicial review, notwithstanding protests to the contrary. While
other good reasons may exist to affirm tradition, the claim that rejection of social changebased claims is necessarily more respectful of the judiciary’s limited, non-majoritarian
role should not be counted among them.

II. The Pervasive Practice of Fact-Based Decision-Making
Facts about social groups tend to dominate judicial opinions regarding group
members’ rights. Yet facts are only a small part of the analysis necessary to answer the
standard constitutional inquiry whether a restriction on group members’ rights can be
justified.34 Normative judgments about the weight to be accorded to facts that distinguish

34

Heightened scrutiny will place greater demands on the fit between the government action and the
characteristic of the group but the question whether a salient difference exists between members and nonmembers is the same.
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social groups play the critical analytic role, even though they typically appear in the guise
of facts or are ignored altogether.35
A. “Thin” Facts and Unstated Norms
Most facts will, on their own, be unable to tell us (or courts) whether the singling
out of a social group for a legal burden is reasonable. In the discussion here, I
characterize these kinds of facts as “thin” because of their non-evaluative, empirical, and
largely uncontested nature. 36 The “thin” fact that people with mental retardation learn
differently than others, for example, does not, in itself, justify a limitation of rights. The
fact that women can give birth likewise does not itself justify rules treating women
differently from men. So too the fact that same-sex couples cannot conceive a child
without third-party assistance does not tell us whether gay and lesbian couples may
legitimately be excluded from marriage.
We need more information—specifically, we need the social judgments
associated with these empirical facts – to determine whether the “thin” factual differences
between group members and others should be permitted to justify the legal restriction
imposed. With respect to mental retardation, for example, we might conclude that
limitations on information-processing capacity justify less restrictive involuntary
institutionalization rules for people with mental retardation than for people with mental

35

While empirical facts play a leading role for the majority in this type of case, the dissent, if there is one,
does not accord them the same centrality. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. For clarity,
references to judicial opinions throughout the article encompass majority and unanimous opinions unless
otherwise indicated.
36
I contrast “thin” facts with “thick” evaluative facts in Section II.B. infra. Other typologies could be
developed to capture courts’ treatment of facts that would extend beyond the thin/thick categories drawn
here. For example, additional categories could include facts that are a) mistaken; b) true but irrelevant; and
c) unclear. I thank Michael Klarman for this observation. For purposes of understanding the judicial
response to changing views of social groups, these distinctions that affect the entanglement of facts and
norms are captured adequately by the thin/thick binary discussed here.
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illness.37 Or we might conclude that the difference, while uncontestable as a factual
matter, is not important for this purpose.38 We can see this, likewise, with respect to the
facts of childbirth and conception. Neither of these facts, which we conventionally think
of as science-based or empirical, automatically generate a conclusion about the
reasonableness of restrictions based on sex or sexual orientation. It is the social overlay
that enables that judgment.
The point, simply put, is that empirical facts and the social norms related to them,
while often seen as inextricably related, are actually separate strands of information.39 I
belabor the point, though it is an obvious one, because courts tend to ignore it while
holding out empirical facts, alone, as sufficient to justify legal rules that distinguish
between social groups. In Heller v. Doe, for example, the Court did precisely that, citing
facts about mental retardation related to the timing and methods of diagnosis to justify a
lower standard of proof for involuntary commitment of people with mental retardation
than people with mental illness.40 “Kentucky’s basic premise that mental retardation is
easier to diagnose than is mental illness has a sufficient basis in fact,”41 the Court
concluded.

37

See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (sustaining a Kentucky statute making it easier for the state to
institutionalize involuntarily a person with mental retardation than a person with mental illness).
38
See id. at 335-49 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39
Norms themselves also should be understood as comprised of multiple judgments, even when they
appear to express a broad, unilateral view of a characteristic or form of conduct. When the norm is wellsettled, the individual strands of judgment remain unseen. But if the general norm is contested and
becomes destabilized, the strands become relevant as some specific norms fall away while others retain
their force. A general norm disapproving homosexuality, for instance, may be comprised of several
specific strands—some disapproving adult relationships with children as parents or teachers; others related
to valuing non-gay partnerships over gay partnerships; and still others related to disapproval of gay people
as tenants or employees. As the broad norm becomes destabilized, some strands will carry greater force
than others, as will be discussed in greater detail below.
40
Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-23.
41
Id. at 322; see also id. at 323 (“Mental retardation is a permanent, relatively static condition, [] so a
determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy based on previous behavior.”); id. at 324
(“The prevailing methods of treatment for the mentally retarded, as a general rule, are much less invasive
than are those given the mentally ill.”). More generally, the Court concluded that the “distinction between
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill” is a matter of “commonsense.” Id. at 326-27.
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Similarly, the fact of childbirth became the focal explanation for the sex-based
citizenship rule in Nguyen v. INS, where the Court relied on women’s role in childbirth to
sustain an immigration law that made it easier for U.S. citizen mothers than U.S. citizen
fathers to have citizenship conferred on their foreign-born children.42 That empirical fact,
reasoned the Court, enabled mothers to be more likely than fathers to develop the “real,
everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the
United States.”43 Likewise, the biological facts of procreation have been relied upon to
validate the exclusion of gay couples from marriage.44
In treating an empirical fact as proof of the reasonableness of a related law, courts
thus relegate the social norm, which is doing the actual probative work, to a behind-the-

42

533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). For purposes of the analysis here, I am setting aside the obvious point that
childbirth itself provides evidence of parentage, placing women in a different position from men. I do so
because although the majority found this evidentiary justification supported the rule, it separately accepted
the government’s argument that mothers, by virtue of giving birth, are more likely than fathers to develop a
meaningful relationship with the child. Id. at 64-65.
43
Id. at 65. Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology, including
women’s capacity for lactation, to argue that women’s child-nurturing orientation is a fact, not a norm.
However, the methodological assumptions that support the equation of biology with nurturing instinct are
highly contested in ways that the fact of lactation (or childbirth) is not. For that reason, perhaps,
contentions regarding endocrinological differences are not the sort of facts on which courts tend to rely to
justify sex-based rules. The same is true for the contentions regarding ethnic differences in cognitive
ability espoused in The Bell Curve and similar literature; while the conclusions are offered as empirical
fact, they have not received wide acceptance as such, at least in part because of the contested methodology
underlying them.
Some would argue that normative commitments to equality override society’s (and courts’)
willingness to consider “real,” empirical differences based on race or sex, among other characteristics.
Others would maintain that the methodology these authors utilize to reach conclusions regarding racial
differences in intelligence is itself embedded with the normative presumptions it purports to prove. On
either view, because the alleged facts are not widely considered uncontestable, they lack the credibilitypreserving function that uncontested facts bring to judicial analysis. See infra Part V. For related debate
arising from the statements of Lawrence Summer regarding the relationship between sex and scientific
aptitude, compare, e.g., Olivia Judson, Op-Ed, Different but (Probably) Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005,
§ 4, at 17, with W. Michael Fox & Richard Alm, Op-Ed, Scientists Are Made, Not Born, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2005, at A19.
44
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing approvingly the
opinions of several courts that “rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the limitation of marriage to
members of the opposite sex [by relying] upon the role that marriage plays in procreation and in providing
the optimal environment for child rearing”). See also infra text accompanying notes 217-224.
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scenes role.45 In Heller, for example, something more than differences in processing
skills had to be at issue to sustain the different institutionalization rules; after all, that
same information-processing difference did not justify the zoning rule in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center that singled out for restriction a group home for people with
mental retardation.46 Similarly in Nguyen, the biology of childbirth and demographic
statistics related to childrearing could not do the probative work for which they were
relied on by the Court. As the Court itself had recognized previously, neither “inherent”
nor demographic differences between men and women alone can justify sex-based
rules.47 Likewise, the empirical facts of procreation themselves cannot explain the legal
distinction between gay and non-gay people in marriage law. If they did, we would
expect to see legal distinctions based on sexual orientation outside of marriage, which we
largely do not, and we would expect every marriage lawsuit brought by a gay couple to
be decided the same way.
The reason for sustaining one distinction and rejecting another thus lies not in
empirical facts but instead in normative judgments that give social meaning to “thin”
factual differences. But how can these judgments about group members’ capacity or
status go unmentioned as they fill in the pieces between the facts about a group and a
restrictive law limiting group members’ rights? It is the legal fiction that facts can lead
directly to judgments, which undergirds the concept of fact-based adjudication advanced

45

As will be elaborated below, there is a set of cases in which norms are declared to be decisive. But this
generally occurs when a norm is thought to be well-settled by virtue of earlier opinions or positive law,
which avoids or at least moderates concerns about judicial overreaching. See infra Part II.B.
46
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450-51 (1985).
47
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (holding that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between
men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity”); Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that wives’ greater financial dependence on their
husbands could not justify a sex-based workers’ compensation rule regarding death benefit eligibility); see
also infra text accompanying notes 114-117.
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here, that facilitates this type of undertheorized decision making. In effect, fact-based
adjudication enables courts to engage in a form of judicial notice through which they
incorporate the social overlay given to empirical facts. Unlike ordinary judicial notice,
however, which requires transparency regarding assumptions made by courts, judicial
assumptions regarding social norms generally go unmentioned. The fiction of fact-based
adjudication thus enables hosts of normative determinations about the capacity and status
of social groups to operate both unidentified by and undefended in majority opinions
even as those normative judgments determine the analysis.
The work of these norms is often made explicit by dissents, which regularly
identify and challenge the majority’s unspoken normative judgments. In Heller, for
example, Justice Souter’s dissent (for four members of the Court) conceded that
“[o]bviously there are differences between mental retardation and mental illness,”48 but
concluded that the factual differences could not support Kentucky’s separate rules.
Instead, Justice Souter argued, an impermissible norm, unacknowledged by the majority,
enabled these factual differences to be given undeserved significance. It is “difficult,” he
wrote, “to see [the classification, which gave family members greater control over
institutionalization of people with mental retardation than people with mental illness] as
resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption that the retarded are
‘perpetual children.’”49

48

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 337 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). In addition to highlighting the norms
that he believed to be at work, Justice Souter also disagreed with the majority’s account of empirical
differences between mental retardation and mental illness. See id. at 342-46 (arguing , based on social
science literature, that treatment of people with mental retardation often involves invasive procedures,
contrary to the majority’s contention); see also id. at 342 (“[A]ny apparent plausibility in the Court’s
suggestion that ‘the mentally retarded in general are not subjected to [invasive mind-altering treatment]
dissipates the moment we examine readily available material on the subject, including studies . . . cited by
the Court.”) (internal citation omitted).
49
Id. at 348.
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The dissenters in Nguyen similarly criticized the majority’s move directly from
empirical fact to legal conclusion via an unacknowledged (and, according to the dissent,
impermissible) norm.50 They stressed the lack of automaticity between the empirical fact
(women give birth to children) identified as decisive by the majority and the sex-based
citizenship rule that imposed a lesser burden on mothers than fathers.51 “The physical
differences between men and women . . . do not justify [the statute’s] discrimination,”
O’Connor wrote.52 She added that the majority could connect the two and sustain the
challenged law only by overlaying the empirical fact of childbirth with the normative
view that women have a stronger instinct to parent than men.
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the
goal of a “real, practical relationship” . . . finds support not in biological
differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., “the generalization that
mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to develop caring
relationships with their children.” Such a claim relies on “the very
stereotype the law condemns,” “lends credibility” to the generalization,
and helps convert that “assumption” into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.”53
And this normative view, she contended, was impermissible.
Romer v. Evans54 illustrates the point as well, although in Romer the dissent
highlighted a normative judgment about the social group in question that, in its view,
should have overlaid the majority’s analysis and validated the challenged Colorado ban
50

Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 88-89.
52
Id. at 87 (internal citation and punctuation omitted). To strengthen the case that an impermissible
traditional norm had been applied, Justice O’Connor situated the law historically, declaring it
“paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility,
for nonmarital children.” Id. at 92 (citing to legislative history).
The dissenters also rejected the majority’s fact-based conclusion that more evidence of parenthood
is needed from fathers than mothers because the evidence of pregnancy and childbirth is missing. See id. at
81-82 (“[A] mother will not always have formal legal documentation of birth because a birth certificate
may not issue or may subsequently be lost. Conversely, a father’s name may well appear on a birth
certificate. While it is doubtless true that a mother’s blood relation to a child is uniquely ‘verifiable from
the birth itself’ to those present at birth, the majority has not shown that a mother’s birth relation is
uniquely verifiable by the INS, much less that any greater verifiability warrants a sex-based, rather than a
sex-neutral, statute.”) (internal citation omitted).
53
Id. at 88-89 (internal citations omitted).
54
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
51
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on antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals. The majority had
pinned its rejection of the government’s proffered rationales55 on the lack of connection
between those rationales and the surrounding facts. Given the sweep of the amendment,
no facts could be sufficient to justify Colorado’s action, the Court wrote. It characterized
the amendment as “a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context” that
might support its legitimacy.56 While the majority admittedly did not hinge its decision
on facts specific to gay people, it also avoided engaging with normative judgments
directly related to gay people. In response, the dissent chastised the majority for
improperly disregarding a legitimate norm—“moral disapproval of homosexual conduct”
—that could have established a connection between the amendment’s classification, the
empirical facts regarding gay people, and Colorado’s alleged interests in preserving
associational freedom and scarce resources.57
B. “Thick” Facts and the Merger of Norm Into “Fact”
Sometimes, in contrast to the “thin” empirical facts described in the preceding
discussion, “facts” about a social group on which courts rely actually do justify, as a
logical matter, restrictions on group members’ rights. The “facts” that people with
mental retardation are “socially inadequate” and “manifestly unfit,” for example, could
reasonably support the conclusion that the state may sterilize them.58 Similarly, the
“fact” that women are naturally domestic itself justifies restrictions on women’s role in

55

Id. at 635 (describing the rationales as “respect for . . . the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality” and “interest in conserving resources to fight
discrimination against other groups”).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also infra note 112.
58
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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the workplace.59 Likewise, the “fact” that gay people are less able than non-gay people
to parent children supports a ban on adoption by lesbians and gay men.60
Yet these “facts” have explanatory bite precisely because they contain judgments
under the pretense of empiricism. Put another way, while they are put forward as truths,
which would suggest they are subject to observation-based verification, they actually
contain both description (group X has a particular characteristic) and evaluation (the
characteristic limits the status or capacity of group X).61 In the typology set out here, I
term them “thick” facts or normative facts to capture their loaded, evaluative nature.
This is not to suggest that courts are always conscious of the normative judgments
embedded in the thick facts on which they rely. To the contrary, during the time that they
are thought of as fact rather than norm, these “facts” are frequently characterized and
understood as “natural” attributes of the affected social group.62 Normative judgments, in
other words, have great power to shape perceptions of fact. The “fact” that women were
seen as naturally better suited than men to care for home and hearth is illustrative. For
59

See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J. concurring).
See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11th Cir. 2004)
(characterizing parenting by a mother and father as the “optimal social structure” for childrearing), reh’g en
banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
61
The identification of “facts” as including normative judgments in addition to empirical truths about
group members is post-hoc. At the time they are relied upon, these “facts” often are so deeply naturalized
by the surrounding society that they are believed by both courts and the surrounding society to be
empirical. Only later, when perceptions of group members change, do the normative judgments reflected
in these facts come to be seen, and, often, rejected by courts. Cf. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Polity, in
RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 13, 18-19 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds., 1999) (“The point is . . . that a
political philosophy necessarily involves factual (descriptive and theoretical) assumptions as well as
normative claims about the polity, and if the former are not explicitly stated and highlighted as integral to
the political philosophy, it is often simply because they are part of the conservative, background ‘common
sense’ that its proponents take for granted.”).
Courts are not merely passive players here, however. By selecting among facts, they reinforce
perceptions that those facts are true, even when they are not empirically supportable. In Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), for example, Justice Bradley’s concurrence, which stressed that women were
unsuited for employment outside the home in light of their domestic natures and responsibilities, not only
rested on but also reinforced an inaccurate perception of women as purely domestic at a time when many
women were employed in the labor force. Id. at 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Further, some
would argue that courts deploy norms as facts strategically to avoid the conflict associated with supporting
controversial norms. See infra Part VI.
62
Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (observing that the Court’s Justices are
sometimes able to perceive significant facts . . . that eluded their predecessors”).
60
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many courts (and the surrounding society),63 the empirical fact of women’s greater
likelihood to be primary caregivers for children evidenced not just a demographic reality
but also a “truth” ordained by nature that woman’s place was in the home.64 From this
“natural” fact, all sorts of distinctions between men and women reasonably could be
sustained.65
The conflation of fact and norm into normative fact typically becomes apparent
only after perceptions of the status or capacity of social group members have shifted.
When the reality of women’s lives could no longer be reconciled with the image of
women as helpless and ignorant, for example, the normative, gendered nature of the
presumptions underlying assertions of women’s natural domesticity became clear.66
Until that time, though, normative facts and empirical facts tend to function
indistinguishably in the eyes of courts.
Some of the most striking uses of normative facts to justify legal burdens on
social groups appear in early race discrimination cases, where normative judgments about
African Americans were treated as facts that proved the legal relevance of racial
differences. In 1867, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the state’s
antimiscegenation law on the ground that “[t]he natural separation of the races is . . . an
undeniable fact.”67 By treating the normative conclusion about racial separation as

63

As Michael Klarman has observed, judges typically share the normative views (and, consequently, the
perceptions of norms as fact) that are popular in the elite social circles in which they live and work. See
Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1998).
64
This conversion of a demographic fact into “natural” truth about a social group was selective, of course.
Demographic research also showed that many women—particularly women who were not white or married
to wealthy men—worked outside the home. Yet courts disregarded these other facts in making
determinations about women’s capacity.
65
See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J. concurring); Gosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66
(1948) (validating Michigan’s sex-based restrictions for liquor licenses).
66
Some evolutionary biologists would point to gendered differences in endocrinology and the capacity for
lactation to argue that women’s domestic orientation is a fact, not a norm. As mentioned earlier, however,
courts do not rely on these facts as the basis for sex-based differential treatment. See supra note 43.
67
West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867) (emphasis added).
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“natural,” the court facilitated a logical flow between the “facts” and the challenged
law.68
Around the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the state’s
antimiscegenation statute based on “[o]ur daily observation . . . that the offspring of these
unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they are inferior in
physical development and strength, to the fullblood of either race.”69 Sustaining a similar
law in 1883, the Missouri Supreme Court pointed to the “well authenticated fact that if
the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman,
intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny.”70
Analogous deployments of normative facts appear in cases involving social
groups defined by sex, mental retardation and sexual orientation, among other
characteristics. A few additional illustrations are offered here to flesh out the work of
these “thick” facts.
In the context of sex-based distinctions, Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in
Bradwell v. Illinois71 is perhaps the most familiar example of a norm operating as fact.
From the “fact” of “[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex,”72 Justice Bradley concluded that women were “unfit[] . . . for many of the
occupations of civil life,” including the practice of law.73 Famously too, the Supreme

68

See id. at 213-14 (defending decision as “not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to
suffer men to follow the law of races . . . and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts”).
69
Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
70
State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
71
83 U.S. 130 (1872).
72
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
73
Id. In doing so, he also commingled empirical facts, like the law of coverture, along with other “facts”
like “the law of the Creator” to reinforce his conclusion about women’s capacity. Id.
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Court in Muller v. Oregon74 converted the demonstrable fact of biological sex differences
into the normative fact of women’s physical limitations.
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by
each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor,
particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future
well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and
in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.75
From these “facts,” the conclusion that restrictions on women’s labor were permissible
flowed logically: “This difference justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that
which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.”76
Buck v. Bell77 illustrates the similar operation of norms-as-facts in connection
with mental retardation. In upholding the Virginia law authorizing sterilization of
“mental defectives” on due process grounds, Justice Holmes, in his brief opinion, did not
discuss mental retardation in terms of its empirical effect on intellectual capacity.78
Instead, consistent with the views of the day and his own views, he treated as fact that
people with mental retardation were potential “menace[s],” “manifestly unfit,” and more
74

208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 422. Justice O’Connor’s point in Nguyen, discussed above, was that the Court had again taken
physical differences between men and women and imputed them impermissibly with normative
significance to justify upholding differential sex-based rules. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
State courts took an approach to women’s and men’s physical differences similar to that of the
Muller majority. Calling on received wisdom about women’s physical capacities, the New York Court of
Appeals observed that “no one doubts that as regards bodily strength and endurance, [woman] is inferior
and that her health in the field of physical labor must be specially guarded by the state.” People v. Charles
Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915). In an earlier ruling in the Washington Territory, the
territorial supreme court likewise pointed to physical differences between men and women to bolster the
normative fact that women lacked the sort of competence required of grand jurors. Harland v. Territory, 3
Wash. Terr. 131 (1887). Jury duty, the court wrote, imposed a responsibility “so onerous and burdensome”
that it was “utterly unsuited to the physical constitution of females.” Id. at 140.
76
Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23. The power of this gendered normative fact to rationalize a restriction on
women’s work hours may help explain how the Court could have sustained that law while striking down on
contractual freedom grounds nearly all other protective legislation that came before the Court in the same
time period. Of course, other related factors, including a lesser tradition of contractual freedom for women
than men also might have influenced the Court. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1960, 1969 (2003) (book review) (stating that at the time of Muller, “[t]he Supreme Court . .
. was not yet ready to treat women as fully equal citizens entitled to the same degree of liberty of contract
as men.”).
77
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
78
Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443 n.9 (1985) (discussing four
categories of mental retardation based on IQ scores).
75
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prone to crime and dependence on public support than others.79 In other words, the fears
and related normative judgments about the dangers of people with mental retardation that
were popular at the time were presented as empirical fact.80 As a result, the analytic
move from fact to justification was perfectly logical; the normative fact itself did
sufficient explanatory work to sustain the decision to sterilize Carrie Bell.
In the context of sexual orientation, a recent Eleventh Circuit ruling actually
conceded that the “fact” about gay people on which it relied to sustain Florida’s ban on
adoption by lesbians and gay men was not subject to substantiation.81 Florida had argued
that “children benefit from the presence of both a father and mother in the home” more
than they would from two parents of the same sex.82 Although extensive expert
testimony had contested this “fact” at trial, the court concluded that it was “one of those
‘unprovable assumptions’ that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative
action.”83 Affirmation of the state’s adoption ban flowed logically from the acceptance

79

Buck, 274 U.S. at 206-07. At the same time, we know that Justice Holmes was not particularly
concerned with the accuracy of the facts before him. “I hate facts,” he once wrote in response to Justice
Brandeis’ suggestion that he visit textile mills in Massachusetts. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 13 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961) (1941).
80
In his opinion in Cleburne, Justice Marshall elaborated the widespread use of normative facts about
people with mental retardation to justify severe burdens. As part of his historical argument for heightened
scrutiny of mental retardation-based classifications, he noted that by the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
“leading medical authorities and others began to portray the ‘feeble-minded’ as a ‘menace to society and
civilization . . . responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems.’” Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring). These views then became the normative facts that guided the
analysis in Buck v. Bell. Cf. Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
283 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (invalidating statute premised on the assumption “that certain retarded children are
uneducable and untrainable”).
81
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc
denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
82
Id. at 819. This “fact” has been contested strenuously by many experts as well as the 11th Circuit’s
dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he fact that Florida places children for adoption with single parents directly and explicitly contradicts
Florida’s post hoc assertion that the ban is justified by the state’s wish to place children for adoption only
with ‘families with married mothers and fathers.’”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the
Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 159 (2001).
83
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20. The court might have been discomfited by its admission that the rationale
on which it rested depended on gut instinct. Shortly after acknowledging the absence of proof for its
assumption that mothers and fathers were better for children than two mothers or two fathers, the court
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of this normative fact. After all, if gay couples are believed to be less suitable parents
than non-gay couples, how could the state do anything other than ban gay people from
adopting?84 The normative fact, in other words, “explained” the classification.
In sum, the facts held out as decisive by many courts turn out to supply little of a
decision’s reasoning. Instead, it is the norms associated with or embedded in those facts
that do the explanatory work in adjudication related to social groups, even as those norms
remain unspoken.

III. Fact-Based Interventions in Contested Normative Terrain
The fiction of fact-based decision-making operates forcefully when invoked by
courts in response to social groups’ claims that changed societal views require
reconsideration and rejection of traditional rationales for restricting group members’
rights. In these cases, courts typically remain silent regarding their normative positions
and either embrace “new” facts about a group or hew to old ones. Eventually, as factbased decisions accrete, courts appear to gain the confidence necessary to tip toward
making explicitly norm-based decisions. This Part will track these dynamics and close
with consideration of the point at which norm contests become relevant to adjudication
regarding social groups. Later Parts will analyze the practical and theoretical conditions

pointed to the failure of “the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience . . . [to]
discover[] a superior model” to the household headed by a mother and a father. Id. at 820.
This is not the first time a court has relied on unprovable assumptions. Indeed, the Supreme Court
specifically endorsed these sorts of assumptions in connection with obscenity, holding that “a state
legislature may [] act on the [] assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused
on obscene conduct, ha[s] a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior[.]” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). The cases on which the Court relied
for this proposition in Paris, however, concerned antitrust, securities, environmental regulation, and
obscenity. See id. at 61-63. None concerned assumptions regarding social groups or the effect of aspects
of individual identity.
84
Of course, the same normative fact could support restrictions on gay parents other than an outright
adoption ban. For example, via this normative fact, Florida also could ban gay people from serving as
foster parents, which it does not, or place gay parents at the bottom of an adoption priority list.
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that lead courts to prefer facts to norm declarations while views of social groups are in
contest.
A. Intervention Via “New” Facts
The judicial inclination toward norm avoidance where social norms are in contest
can be seen in a wide range of cases brought by social groups maintaining that
traditionally accepted rationales for discriminatory treatment must give way in light of
changing social views.85 Brown v. Board of Education86 is perhaps the best-known
example of the judicial inclination to use “new” facts to justify new conclusions about
previously settled matters while avoiding mention of the underlying norm shifts. In
reversing Plessy v. Ferguson’s87 separate but equal doctrine as applied to public
education, the Court identified “modern” knowledge as its analytic linchpin: “Whatever
may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding [that racially segregated schooling causes harm] is amply supported by
modern authority.”88 The Court also pointed to other changed facts to support its
analysis, noting, for example, the changed “status of public education”89 and the
heightened achievements of African Americans in professional and cultural circles.90
Nowhere in the decision did norms regarding African Americans or racial equality

85

While the social group will contend that society’s views have changed in ways that render ongoing
discrimination impermissible, courts may or may not agree with that characterization. For further
discussion of when and why norm shifts gain traction with courts, see infra 135-151.
86
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
88
Brown, 347 U.S at 494.
89
Id. at 489. See also id. at 492-93 (“We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”).
90
Id. at 490 (“Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences
as well as in the business and professional world.”). Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863
(1992) (explaining that “the Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts
apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision [in Brown] to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not
only justified but required.”).
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receive mention.91 Later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,92 the Court reinforced that
changed conceptions of facts, rather than changes to social norms, accounted for Plessy’s
reversal. As the Court explained, “the Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision [in Brown] to
reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but required.”93
The California Supreme Court similarly treated “new” facts regarding race as
decisive in striking down the state’s antimiscegenation law at a time when such laws
were widely viewed as permissible.94 The factual grounds for race discrimination in

91

In offering a rationale for Brown different from the one advanced by the Court, Charles Black
acknowledged the Court’s reliance on facts rather than norm declarations in its opinion.
It seems to me that the venial fault of the opinions consists in its not spelling out that
segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race. (I
would conjecture that the motive for this omission was reluctance to go into the
distasteful details of the southern caste system.) That such treatment is generally not
good for children needs less talk than the Court gives it.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1959-60).
The surrounding global political context, in which the persistence of racial segregation was
perceived as undermining the United States’ position in the Cold War, also went unmentioned in Brown.
See Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War, 81 J. AM. HIST. 543, 544 (1994)
(“On one hand, the United States claimed that democracy was superior to communism as a form of
government, particularly in its protection of individual rights and liberties; on the other hand, the nation
practiced pervasive race discrimination. . . . The Soviet Union and the Communist press in various nations
used the race issue very effectively in anti-American propaganda.”).
For illustration of state court inclinations to avoiding normative declarations that might be subject
to contestation, see, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (citing facts about how
two gay men lived together as “permanent life partners” to include them within the statutory term “family”
for purposes of succession to a rent-controlled apartment rather than making the normative judgment that
would be required to decide whether unlawful sexual orientation or marital status discrimination underlay
the attempted eviction).
92
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93
Id. at 863. The Court in Casey also recognized that its pattern of fact-based decision-making carried
over to contexts unrelated to shifting judgments about social groups. Discussing the Lochner era and its
demise, the Court observed that
West Coast Hotel [v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)] . . . rested on facts, or an understanding of
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country could
understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day . . . had not
been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus comprehensible they were also defensible . . . as
applications of constitutional principles to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before.
Id. at 863-64.
94
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). See also Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism
and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 601 (2000) (describing the
court’s ruling as “the first true crack in the courts’ monolithic support for the constitutionality of
miscegenation statutes”); see also Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (sustaining
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marriage had long been seen as well-settled: “[T]he prohibition of intermarriage . . .
prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose members are by
nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”95 In response, the court turned to
science to demonstrate that the once-operative facts96 had discredited normative
underpinnings.
The categorical statement that non-Caucasians are inherently physically
inferior is without scientific proof. In recent years scientists have attached
great weight to the fact that their segregation in a generally inferior
environment greatly increases their liability to physical ailments.97
The court also pointed to the absence of “scientific proof that one race is superior to
another in native ability.”98 Once it had framed the facts in this way, its rejection of the
racial classification seemed all but mandatory.99
Although the Court’s decision upholding the University of Michigan Law
School’s consideration of race in admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger100 arguably involves
the issue of affirmative action more so than the social group of African Americans or
people of color more broadly, it similarly illustrates the judicial preference for
intervening in contested normative territory via facts. Rather than declare affirmative
action to be a normatively desirable form of redress for past discrimination,101 the Court
Alabama’s antimiscegenation statute), cert. denied, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1954); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d
749 (Va. 1955) (sustaining Virginia’s similar law).
95
Perez, 198 P.2d at 23.
96
Cf. id. at 26 (“Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, [defenders of the antimiscegenation law]
reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in health, intelligence, and culture, and that this
inferiority proves the need of the barriers of race prejudice.”).
97
Id. at 23-24.
98
Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted) (also observing that ‘[t]he data on which Caucasian superiority is based
have undergone considerable re-evaluation by social and physical scientists in the past two decades.”).
99
To support this analytic move, the court also highlighted Gunnar Myrdal’s work linking the earlier
normative facts about race to bias in observation. Id. at 723 n.6. The court held out Myrdal’s observations,
together with the scientific data just mentioned, as requiring its conclusion that previous beliefs about
African Americans amounted to norms rather than facts. Id. (“ ‘[T]he ordinary white American . . . has
made an error in inferring that observed differences were innate and a part of ‘nature’ ’ ”).
100
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
101
Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views from the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928 (2001).

29
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

focused on the factual benefits derived from student diversity, as evidenced by “expert
studies and reports entered into evidence at trial.”102 “Numerous studies show that
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals,’”
the Court wrote.103 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court acknowledge the contestable
methodological choices made by the studies on which it relied.104
Early decisions in the contemporary women’s rights cases also illustrate this
pattern of norm-avoidance. Beginning with Reed v. Reed,105 numerous fact-based
decisions reflected a commitment to women’s equality without ever acknowledging the
shift from earlier, contrary norms. In Reed, the Court highlighted a fact (women have at
least as much experience as men with administering estates) to help explain its
determination that Idaho’s subordination of wives to husbands in prioritizing estate
administrators was arbitrary.106 It never mentioned, much less refuted, the traditional
sex-based norm relied on by the Idaho Supreme Court to sustain the law: “[N]ature itself
has established the distinction” between men and women, the Idaho court wrote.107 By
sidestepping this traditionally accepted judgment about men and women and offering up
facts instead, the U.S. Supreme Court left the norm confrontation for another day.108

102

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
104
Arguably, Justice O’Connor’s statement that the “path to leadership” must be “visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity” to insure leaders’ “legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry,” id. at 332, constitutes a norm declaration regarding the value of affirmative action. See BrownNagin, supra note 4, at 1484 (describing this statement as “the most morally focused argument for raceconscious admissions in the majority opinion”). However, the statement also can be read as a positive
description of affirmative action’s effects on democracy and legitimacy, rather than as a commitment to
affirmative action as a moral good.
105
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
106
Id. at 76-77.
107
Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970).
108
In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S 632 (1974), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 419 U.S. 822
(1974), among others, the Court similarly invalidated pregnancy-based and sex-based rules, not by
declaring normative opposition to those sorts of legal distinctions, but instead by finding that the facts
103
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Romer v. Evans109 illustrates this same point with respect to sexual orientation
classifications. Until Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick’s declaration that homosexuality was
rightfully the subject of moral and legislative disapproval represented the prevailing
constitutional discourse regarding homosexuality.110 Thus, for Romer to recognize the
claim that a state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people
violated the rights of lesbians and gay men, it had to reject, or at least deviate from, the
traditionally embraced views of gay people reflected in Bowers. Yet the majority opinion
did not acknowledge this move. As noted earlier, it refused to recognize the normative
shift implicit in its decision and instead anchored its invalidation of Colorado’s
amendment on the ban’s factual disconnect with the state’s asserted interests.111 Despite
Justice Scalia’s objection in dissent that the traditional social norm disapproving of
homosexuality sufficed to justify the challenged measure,112 the Romer Court avoided
any overt engagement with that moral judgment.113
As these cases illustrate, when breaking with tradition, the Court has led with
facts and left norms aside.
B. Fact-Based Decisions as the Groundwork for Norm Declarations
Even in light of courts’ apparent preference for fact-based decision-making in

related to pregnancy and to child care did not support the legal restriction imposed. This is true as well for
cases affirming sex-based distinctions post-Reed, such as Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), in which norm declarations were largely absent from the
majority opinion and the focus was, instead, on the factual support for the challenged rules.
109
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
110
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
111
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. See also supra note 55 (describing Colorado’s rationales).
112
“It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion” of the moral disapproval rationale, Justice Scalia
wrote, “since the answer [to the question of the rationale’s applicability here] is so obviously yes.” Id. at
640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. at 653 (describing as legitimate the people’s desire “to prevent
piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans”).
113
Romer could be characterized as a “norm” case to the extent it is read to announce (or affirm) a general
norm that hostility toward a group of people cannot justify restrictions on the rights of group members. To
the extent Romer is understood as signaling a shift in the constitutional rights of gay people, however, the
Court left that normative shift unacknowledged.
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contested cultural arenas, it would strain credibility to suggest that courts avoid norms
altogether. My argument, instead, is that fact-based decision-making is the first step of a
two-step decision-making dynamic. As numerous cases illustrate, fact-based decisions
lay the groundwork for later declarations of normative shifts; overt rejection of traditional
views about the worth of social groups tends to occur only after one or more fact-based
decisions have effectively, though not explicitly, disavowed the previously embraced
norms. We might think of this process as involving the accretion of fact-based
decisions—once the “new” understanding of facts has become settled, the potential
controversy associated with judicial intervention into contested normative terrain is
diminished. This accretion model applies not only to review of individual cases but also,
as I will show below, to the labeling of classifications as suspect or quasi-suspect.
The trajectory of women’s rights cases nicely illustrates the accretion dynamic.
Only after Reed and several additional fact-intensive opinions that sustained claims for
sex equality did a majority of the Court openly embrace the normative value of sex
equality. When the Court ultimately made that commitment explicit, it treated its move
not as declaring a “new” norm but as articulating a norm whose settlement was evidenced
by earlier (fact-based) decisions. For example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co.,114 the Court found that women’s disproportionate financial dependence on
their husbands could not support a workers’ compensation provision requiring widowers
but not widows to prove dependence before recovering death benefits.115 Although that
fact undoubtedly would have been taken to justify the different rule in the past, and,

114

446 U.S. 142 (1980).
Id. at 151 (“It may be that there is empirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be
the principal supporters of their spouses and families.”).

115
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indeed, was treated as decisive by the lower court,116 the Court declared the devaluation
of women’s work relative to their husbands’ to conflict with a now-settled norm of sex
equality: “It is this kind of discrimination against working women that our cases have
identified and in the circumstances found unjustified.”117
The accretion phenomenon also explains the timing of announcements of
heightened scrutiny. These declared commitments to rigorous review of particular
classifications have occurred only after the accretion of a series of fact-based decisions
regarding the social group in question.118 Once earlier decisions are in place, the
Supreme Court appeared to reach a comfort level that serious contestation of the social
group’s status relative to its counterpart group has passed. Heightened scrutiny, in other
words, signals the settlement of a “new” general norm (at least from the Court’s
perspective) that promotes skepticism toward specific judgments about social group
members that previously would have been found to justify different treatment.119 This

116

See id. at 150 (“‘[T]he substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women
justifies the advantage that [the law] administratively gives to a widow.’”) (quoting Wengler, 583 S.W.2d
162, 168 (Mo. 1979)). For discussion of earlier norms and their influence on workers compensation and
wrongful death statutes, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN LAW (2004).
117
Wengler, 446 U.S. at 147. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) (holding that
facts related to women’s workforce participation “certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should
be exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home”); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (invalidating sex-based child support rule based on judicial notice of
“[t]he presence of women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life”
and the related conclusion that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”).
118
Heightened scrutiny, after all, represents a deviation from court’s ordinary orientation toward norm
avoidance as it reflects an explicit commitment to skepticism toward distinctions based on facts about the
protected social group.
119
This point is somewhat more complicated with respect to racial classifications than with respect to the
sex classifications discussed below. For one, some version of a race equality norm was acknowledged by
courts almost immediately after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. See Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303-08 (1879). At the same time, however, this recognition did not translate into
broad skepticism of racial classifications. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). Further,
even after the Court first characterized race as a “suspect” ground for classification in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), the Court did not begin actual rigorous review of racial classifications for
another twenty years. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stressing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “strong policy” against racial classifications); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 496-503 (2004) (analyzing evolution of suspect classification
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trajectory—of fact-based cases first and norm declarations thereafter—also helps explain
why the Court appeared to be applying heightened scrutiny in cases involving both sex
and illegitimacy classifications before it acknowledged that it was doing so.120
Once heightened scrutiny has been declared, an equality norm begins to reshape
consideration of facts (and judgments related to those facts) about the social group in
adjudication. In United States v. Virginia,121 for example, the Court overrode perceived
factual differences between men and women and relied on a sex equality norm to
invalidate Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based admission policy.122 Likewise, in J.E.B.
v. Alabama,123 the Court recognized possible differences between male and female jurors
but rejected sex-based peremptory strikes on equality grounds.124 This is not to suggest
that the sex equality norm always carries the day, as Nguyen and other cases show.125
But, as in Wengler and Virginia, among others, the application of heightened scrutiny

analysis); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,
232 (1991) (same).
120
Many scholars have maintained that the Court had been applying heightened scrutiny to sex
classifications since Reed. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-26 (2d ed.
1988); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1972). The Court
likewise appeared to be applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children long before
its formal pronouncement of quasi-suspect classification status for those classifications in 1988. See Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Gunther, supra, at 33-36.
121
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
122
See id. at 533-34 (finding that “inherent differences between men and women” did not justify
constraints on women’s opportunities and that sex-based classifications “may not be used, as they once
were, [] to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”) (citations and
punctuation omitted).
123
511 U.S. 127 (1994).
124
Id. at 138-42.
125
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statute that subjected only men to criminal liability for statutory rape). One
might argue that the accretion phenomenon should lead Nguyen to come out differently, given that it was
decided relatively late in the evolution of women’s rights cases. As noted earlier, however, see supra note
39, when general norms regarding social groups come under challenge, some individual judgments
regarding group members will retain greater force than others. My view is that Nguyen’s holding can be
explained not only because the Court applied greater deference to Congressional action in light of the
citizenship benefit that was at issue or because the Court intended to cut back on the expansive equal
protection reading in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), but also because norms regarding
procreation and childbirth have greater sticking power than other sex-related norms. I develop this
argument at length in a forthcoming article.
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illustrates a willingness to engage in overt norm-based adjudication in a way that does not
take place when norms are perceived by the Court to be unsettled.
The accretion phenomenon is not limited to classifications that are ultimately
subjected to heightened scrutiny. Among sexual orientation cases, for example, we can
explain the relationship among Bowers v. Hardwick,126 Romer v. Evans,127 and Lawrence
v. Texas128 through this lens. In all three cases, the baseline question was whether
anything about homosexuality justified the state’s limitation of gay people’s rights. In
Bowers, the Court treated social norms condemning homosexuality as sufficiently settled
so that they could be stated, without more, as the justification for Georgia’s sodomy
law.129 Then in Romer, as discussed earlier, the Court focused on the lack of factual
support for Colorado’s anti-gay ban and struck down the measure without mentioning the
Bowers-approved norm regarding gay people.130 Romer then served as the fact-based,
norm-avoidant precursor for Lawrence’s outright rejection of the moral disapproval
norm.131
Of course, a host of other explanations could account for the different
adjudicative approaches of Romer and Lawrence, including the different doctrinal
foundations of the two decisions, with Romer focused on equal protection and Lawrence
126

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
128
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
129
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (relying on “the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). The near-universal condemnation of Bowers
suggested that the Court had miscalculated (or deliberately misrepresented) the degree to which social
norms regarding homosexuality were contested when it glibly asserted the moral disapproval rationale and
brushed off Michael Hardwick’s privacy claim as “at best, facetious.” Id. at 194. See Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 576-75 (citing criticism of Bowers).
130
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
131
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (“This case raises . . . whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral
disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not
heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”). Cf.
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1281-83 (2004) (analyzing the Lawrence majority’s limited engagement with the
moral disapproval rationale).
127
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on due process.132 The moral disapproval rationale was also the leading justification
proffered in Lawrence while several others had been advanced more prominently in
Romer.133 And, certainly, the outlier status of the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law as
only one of a handful of such laws in the nation134 made the normative declaration
relatively safe in Lawrence. But none of these factors fully explain why the Romer
majority did not touch the moral norm advanced so forcefully by the dissent and why
Lawrence ultimately did. The inclination toward norm avoidance when the normative
waters appear to courts to be unsettled, I would argue, provides at least some of that
explanation.
C. The Non-Neutrality of Fact-Based Decision-Making
Judicial responses to norm contests are not monolithic; not always are courts
provoked into norm avoidance simply because a settled norm has been contested. This
section sets out a model for identifying the conditions under which norm contestation
might affect adjudication135 and offers a preliminary critique of the claim that sustaining
the status quo enables courts to remain neutral in cultural conflicts. I return to this point
in greater depth in Part VI’s consideration of the value of candor in adjudication.
Most of the time, norms are so deeply integrated into society that they are unseen
and, if seen, are understood to reflect indisputable judgments about certain aspects of
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Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-35 (invalidating the Colorado amendment on equal protection
grounds), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that “the case should be resolved by determining whether
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution”).
133
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73 (analyzing morals-based government interest); Romer 517 U.S. at
632-36 (addressing government interests related to associational freedom and scarce resources).
134
Lawrence, 539. U.S. at 573 (stating that only four states at that time had sodomy laws targeted only at
sexual conduct of same-sex couples).
135
The framework is not intended to suggest that all norms move through all stages or that the occurrence
of a shift is necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the social group in question.
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social group members’ identity and conduct.136 In this state, norms might be said to be at
room temperature. The Nguyen majority’s declaration that it was “unremarkable” to
equate women’s role in childbirth and child care is illustrative.137 In this naturalized
state, norms can go virtually unnoticed as they create links between empirical facts (men
cannot give birth) and laws limiting social group members’ rights (fathers must take more
steps than mothers to have citizenship conferred on their children even if they are present
at birth).
Even in the most homogeneous communities, however, norms rarely receive
universal ratification. Outlier groups or individuals not only defy but also seek to abolish
or reformulate prevailing norms, invoking constitutional “principles in their own search
for greater freedom.”138 We might think of Myra Bradwell’s challenge to Illinois’s
attorney licensing rule or Carrie Bell’s challenge to Virginia’s sterilization rule in this
way.
Yet these challenges tend to have little effect on adjudicators. Courts either see
no contest or find that contestation too peripheral to have gained traction, and proceed as
though nothing has occurred to destabilize the traditionally accepted facts and norms.
Take, for example, the challenges to marriage laws brought by lesbian and gay couples in
the 1970s and 1980s.139 At that time, movements for gay liberation and gay rights had
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Much critical legal scholarship has concentrated on exposing the way norms blend into what is
perceived as natural. A significant body of feminist literature, for example, has concentrated on exposing
the male bias in many naturalized norms. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985) (explaining the way in which “the subordination in
gender inequality[] is made invisible; dissent from it becomes inaudible as well as rare”). Separately, a
growing body of law and economics literature has focused on harnessing the power of naturalized norms
toward efficient or socially beneficial ends. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
137
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66 (2001).
138
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
139
See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972) (rejecting challenge to marriage law’s
exclusion of gay couples); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (same); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (same); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (same).

37
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

made substantial headway in disrupting the view of gay people as mentally ill140 and
some progress toward dispelling the belief that gay people were inherently inferior to
heterosexuals, as evidenced by the passage of anti-discrimination ordinances prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination.141 Yet not even a tremor of these norm changes
received recognition from any court asked to decide whether state marriage laws
discriminated unlawfully against same-sex couples. Instead, these marriage challenges
were the proverbial easy cases, with arguments dismissed out of hand.142
Some norm contests move past this relatively settled stage and tip into the
mainstream.143 Yet even at this stage, when norm contests become so prominent that
they cannot credibly be ignored, courts typically avoid taking responsibility for their
selection among norms. Instead, their opinions tend either to mention a norm contest as a
reason for affirming the status quo or to justify rejection of the traditionally accepted
view by characterizing the norm contest as having passed. While Part IV will theorize
various motivations for this judicial norm avoidance, the point here is simply that leaving
norms unmentioned does not leave the public debate over norms unaffected.
Judicial opinions addressing gay couples’ challenges to marriage laws are often
framed in this norm-avoidant way. The argument in these cases, like in the similar

140
See infra note 164 (describing removal of homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973).
141
See LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 5-6
(1998).
142
As Mahatma Gandhi observed with respect to social change efforts, “First they ignore you, then they
laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.” At this early contestation stage, courts could be described
as ignoring plaintiffs’ claims.
143
Precisely when challenges to settled norms move from margin to center is, of course, difficult to
identify with precision, as the determination depends on which evidence of contestation, empirical or
otherwise, is valued. See infra text accompanying notes 176-188 (discussing conflicting perspectives of
majority and dissenting opinions on the status of norms regarding the juvenile death penalty). Further, to
be clear, even after a tipping point has been reached, contestation does not disappear entirely. Instead, the
reference to a tipping point suggests that a once-natural norm has begun to lose its dominance among the
general public. In addition, the movement of views regarding social groups through various stages of
contestation is not meant to imply that emergent norms are always preferable to traditionally held views.
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lawsuits of the 1970s and 1980s, maintains that changed views of gay people have
undermined the rationales traditionally accepted to sustain sexual-orientation
discrimination. The claim, in other words, asks courts to select among competing social
norms. Yet regardless of whether courts uphold or strike down the male-female
eligibility rule for marriage, they are unanimous in recasting their role as norm selector
and positioning themselves, instead, as following rather than leading the public debate.144
At one end of the spectrum, for example, while recognizing that “[g]reat strides
have already been made in protecting same-sex partners in New Jersey,” a New Jersey
court wrote that “difficult social issues,” “vital debate, and delicate political negotiations”
required it to sustain “the traditional understanding of marriage” and reject the plaintiffs’
challenge to the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.145 The Arizona Court of

144

Courts in these cases also deploy references to norm contestation when analyzing fundamental rights
claims by same-sex couples. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Ct., 77 P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003),
rev. denied (2004) (“Although same-sex relationships are more open and have garnered greater societal
acceptance in recent years, same-sex marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of
our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”). Because analysis of
fundamental rights claims tends to be backward looking, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161 (1988), only minimal focus is placed on the contemporary validity of the traditional norm that is my
focus here.
Notably, whether courts affirm or reject the status quo, they take care in these cases to express
respect for the sincerity of the views held by those whose position they reject, perhaps as a legitimacypreserving device consistent with their invocation of the countermajoritarian difficulty. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (“[T]he
court is sympathetic to the interests of the plaintiffs . . . .”), aff’d 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (“This Court’s personal view [is] that
children raised by same-sex couples enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal, to those raised by
opposite-sex couples . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(“Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to
the union of one man and one woman . . . .”); Anderson v. King Cty., No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL
1738447, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (“The social issue before the Court [same-sex marriage] is
one about which people of the highest intellect, the deepest morality and the broadest public vision
maintain divergent opinions, strongly held in good faith and all worthy of great respect.”).
145
Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at **25-26. See also id. at *25 (“[T]he Legislature and the courts have
taken significant steps to protect the rights of same-sex couples.”). The court went so far as to catalogue an
extensive series of judicial decisions and statutes providing extensive legal protection for and recognition
of same-sex couples. See id. at **25-26. See also id. at *23 (“Social change of the type sought by
plaintiffs is properly accomplished in the legislative arena.”); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 866
(Sup. Ct., Tompkins County 2005) (“The decision to extend any or all of the benefits associated with
marriage is a task for the Legislature, not the courts. Social perceptions of same-sex civil contracts may
change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters
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Appeals likewise concluded that “although many traditional views of homosexuality have
been recast over time,” the court should leave to “the people of Arizona, through their
elected representatives . . . to decide whether to permit same-sex marriages.”146
At the other end, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed as “a
destructive stereotype” the traditional view “that same-sex relationships are inherently
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.”147 In
light of this norm shift, rationales once accepted to justify different marriage rules for gay
people now must be understood to reflect impermissible “prejudices against persons who
are . . . homosexual,” the court wrote.148 With the problem framed in this way, the court
then fulfilled its duty as the “last instance” protector of constitutional rights and rejected
the discriminatory marriage rule.149 One of several New York Supreme Court rulings on
the state’s marriage law likewise treated the norm contest regarding the legal significance
of sexual orientation differences as essentially over.150 It then characterized its
invalidation of the state’s different-sex requirement for marriage not as staking out new
normative territory but instead as harmonizing with norms already settled by related
jurisprudence and positive law in New York. Its decision, the court wrote, was
is the best.”) aff’d, 2006 WL 346463 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d
270, 277 (Sup. Ct., Rockland County 2004) (“It is the Legislature that is the appropriate body to engage in
the studied debate that must necessarily precede the formulation of social policy with respect to same-sex
marriage and the decision to extend any or all rights and benefits associated with marriage to same-sex
couples, and, in turn, the amendment or expansion of the laws presently governing the institution of
marriage in New York.”).
146
Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465.
147
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (footnote omitted). See also id.
at 968 (finding that no rational basis existed to justify the state’s sex-based marriage restriction and that
“the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are . . . homosexual”).
The court also repudiated a normative preference for heterosexual relationships that may have led
other courts, albeit not overtly, to treat marriage recognition as more sacred, and therefore less subject to
compliance with the equal protection guarantee, than other forms of state action. “Recognizing the right of
an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-sex
marriage,” the court wrote. Id. at 965.
148
Id. at 968.
149
Id. at 966.
150
Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2005), rev’d, Hernandez v. Robles, 805
N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005).
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“consistent with the evolving public policy as demonstrated in recent decisions of the
Court of Appeals and other New York courts, and actions taken by the State Legislature,
the executive branch and local governments.”151
Under either framing of the norm, however, courts do not effectively absent
themselves from the public debate. Choosing the “old” norm over the “new” out of
ostensible deference to the countermajoritarian difficulty neutralizes neither a court’s
decision-making agency nor the decision’s role in strengthening the one norm over the
other. In the marriage cases, judicial affirmations of normative preferences for
heterosexual couples, even if not articulated explicitly, reinforce the legitimacy of that
traditional norm. They supply legislators with reasons to block marriage rights for samesex couples and provide opponents of same-sex couples’ marriages with additional
ballast for their claims that marriage by same-sex couples is not legitimate. To the extent
the trajectory of other legislative (and jurisprudential) change is toward rejecting sexual
orientation-based distinctions, a decision affirming the traditional norm derails or at least
dampens that process. Indeed, where legislative and public policy shifts eliminated
longstanding legal burdens on lesbians and gay men, including by rejecting distinctions
between gay and non-gay parents, courts affirming the traditional negative norm in the
marriage context conceivably could be accused of disrupting or disrespecting the
151

Id. at 607. Two other state supreme court justices disagreed, finding the contest to be sufficiently live
that the issue of equal marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples required legislative, not judicial,
intervention. See supra note 145.
A California Superior Court also looked to the norms reflected in extant state law, including a
state law providing “marriage-like rights,” to find that no legitimate purpose could justify excluding samesex couples from marriage.
California’s enactment of rights for same-sex couples belies any argument that the State
would have a legitimate interest in denying marriage in order to preclude same-sex
couples from acquiring some marital right that might somehow be inappropriate for them
to have. . . . [T]he State’s position that California has granted marriage-like rights to
same-sex couples points to the conclusion that there is no rational basis in denying them
the rites of marriage as well.
In re Coordination Proceeding, Marriage Cases, Tentative Ruling, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *4 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
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democratic process.152
Because both affirmation and rejection of tradition requires selection among
competing norms, the gloss of neutrality often attributed to judicial support for the status
quo is, in short, a legal fiction much like the concept of fact-based adjudication. So too
is the charge that decisions rejecting traditional norms are “activist” in making normative
judgments while those that embrace tradition have, by being passive, kept themselves out
of the business of norm selection. Consequently, to the extent concerns about a
democracy deficit can be raised legitimately in connection with courts that are deciding
cases in the midst of norm contests, those concerns have bite where courts affirm
traditional norms as well as when courts affirm the displacement of traditional rationales
with new norms.

IV. The Role of Social Science and Social Movements
in a Jurisprudence of Fact-Based Decision-Making
Three observations regarding the relationship of social science and social
movements to the transformation of facts and norms flow from the operation of factbased decision-making described above.153
152

By the same token, courts that reject the traditional norm and harmonize marriage law with more recent
developments that reject sexual orientation-based distinctions also are making a contestable normative
judgment regarding the relevance of sexual orientation to marriage. There is no question that these courts
have an effect on the public debate. What interests me here, however, is why courts that affirm tradition
are not also perceived to be making contestable, influential norm selections.
153
For extended discussion of the relationship between courts and social science, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE
LAW (2004); Rachel Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PENN. L. REV. 655 (1988); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
On the relationship between courts and social movements, see, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 4;
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the
Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); Reva B. Siegel,
Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution From a Social Movement Perspective, 150 PA. L. REV. 297
(2001).
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First, social science research can destabilize traditional perceptions of group
members’ capacity by exposing and discrediting norms embedded in “factual”
characterizations of groups. Most classically, courts invoke social science for this
purpose by relying on a particular fact as “proof” to justify the outcome of a case, as in
the Labor Department studies cited in Taylor v. Louisiana to support invalidation of an
automatic jury service exemption for women.154
Dissenters and scholars regularly criticize this form of reliance on facts as
selective or acontextual, yet these criticisms have comparatively little effect so long as
the data are basically credible and the fiction remains in place that facts alone can
determine reasonableness.155 Thus, while literature aimed at showing courts how to work
with social science more productively may be useful to the extent it assists adjudicators in
sifting through and thinking critically about information sources, it is unlikely to
overcome the effects of the operation of fact-based adjudication, which enables courts to
rely on data without acknowledging the normative and methodological choices reflected
in the data selection and analysis. Further, as numerous scholars have noted, more or
“better” information does not necessarily lead people to change their views.156
A separate, potentially more effective function of social science in adjudication is
to identify and explain how bias has shaped perceptions of group members’ status and
capacity. In this respect, social science can destabilize normative facts about a social
group by revealing how misplaced normative judgments have distorted popular
154

419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975)
See infra notes 179-188 and accompanying text (discussing critiques posed by dissenters in Roper v.
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), regarding the process by
which the majority moved from fact to constitutional judgment without acknowledgment of the norms that
shaped the interpretation of evidence).
156
See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
438 (1999) (“When asked to evaluate conflicting empirical studies, subjects credit those that confirm their
prior beliefs and dismiss those that conflict with them.”).
155
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“facts.”157 Heuristic devices of cognitive psychology may be useful in showing, for
example, that a widely accepted fact about a social group rests on faulty premises
because researchers anchored themselves at an arbitrary starting point or ignored
fundamentally conflicting facts.158 In connection with the same-sex marriage example
developed earlier, cognitive psychology may add value to the analysis of the claims that
heterosexual parents are preferable for children by raising questions about biased
anchoring, cognitive dissonance in the evaluation of research data, and other
methodological flaws.159 The California Supreme Court, in striking down the state’s ban
on interracial marriage, similarly deployed social science analysis, as well as
epidemiological data, to enhance its argument that earlier, flawed factual perceptions
regarding the significance of racial differences had been shaped by false normative
presumptions.160
Second, social movements likewise may heighten awareness of the dissonance
between traditional views of a social group and contemporary perceptions.161 Unlike
157

Of course, the direct effect of any social scientific analyses of fact on adjudication is limited largely to
what litigators bring to courts’ attention. Often, this information comes to courts through amicus curiae
briefs filed by professional organizations such as the American Psychological Association. See, e.g., Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the
National Association of Social Workers, et al., filed in Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (on file with the author).
Questions have been raised separately regarding the utility of cognitive psychology related, more
broadly, to issues of institutional design. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring
Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616 (2002).
158
See, e.g., David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ieruli eds.,
1995) (explaining biased anchoring, cascade effects, and other phenomena).
Social science also may serve as a check on factual perceptions held by the general public as well
as other researchers. Its potential revelatory benefit separately motivates arguments in the employment
discrimination context that decision-makers’ biases are often not apparent. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
159
See, e.g., Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 82 (discussing and critiquing studies); see also Stephen A.
Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
537 (2004-05).
160
See supra text accompanying notes 94-99, discussing Perez.
161
The suggestion here that some perceptions are more accurate than others is offered with the awareness
that the concept of accuracy itself is temporally contingent.
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social science research, which can enter the courtroom as evidence, albeit in a limited
fashion, the work of social movements is confined largely to extra-litigation activities.162
Yet it warrants attention because the analytic framework advanced here helps clarify the
movements’ particular influence on adjudication.
Very broadly speaking, identity-based social movements aim to alter what they
view as unfair perceptions of, and unjust laws imposed on, the group they represent.163
Disruption of “facts” embodying negative normative judgments about group members is
a first task of these movements. With negative normative facts about a social group in
place, law reform in the name of equality is virtually impossible because the facts
themselves justify ill treatment of group members. For example, one of the first efforts
of the contemporary gay movement was to challenge the American Psychiatric
Association’s listing of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder in Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.164 Absent that change, most challenges to
government action distinguishing between gay and non-people would have been destined
162

Some social movements also have highly sophisticated legal organizations that participate directly in
the litigation process on group members’ behalf. See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE
ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1999); JACK
GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1995). My focus here is not on gauging the efficacy of legal intervention in
achieving movement goals but rather on identifying with specificity the particular ways in which the work
of social movements may shape judicial responses to claims of societal change. For discussion of the
efficacy of social movements in achieving social justice goals of various constituencies, see, e.g., RICHARD
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
(1991); Brown-Nagin, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 153.
163
For an extensive discussion of the effects of identity-based social movements on law reform, see
Eskridge, supra note 153; Siegel, supra note 153.
164
See Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 L. &
SEXUALITY 1, 26-27 (2003) (describing “the elimination of diagnosis” of homosexuality as a mental
disorder as “a necessary step to secure equal rights for gay men and lesbians”); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1582-83 (1993) (“[T]he most
successful challenge by these new activists was the assault mounted against the American Psychiatric
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders. . . . Because the medical
profession’s definitions of illness can have meaningful legal consequences, this victory within the
American Psychiatric Association was equivalent to winning an important test case in the courts.”)
(footnote omitted); Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of Psychological
Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 495, 541 (stating that “[t]he elimination of the stigma of
mental disease has had a significant influence” on “recognizing the legal rights of homosexuals”).
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to lose because the “fact” of mental illness could justify innumerable restrictions on gay
people’s lives. Similarly, the “fact” that whites were more competent both physically and
intellectually than African Americans had to be destabilized, as did the “fact” of women’s
and men’s natural aptitude differences, before equality claims could be adjudicated
meaningfully.
In the current social climate, the assertion that gay people are less suitable role
models for children than non-gay people presents a similar challenge. To the extent the
assertion is treated as “fact,” it follows logically that governments can restrict gay people
from adopting or from marrying (if marriage is treated as the state’s preferred foundation
for childrearing). While social scientists undertake studies, social movement leaders
undertake public education campaigns and media outreach efforts and pursue a host of
other strategies for raising awareness of the lives of gay people in general and gay parents
in particular.165 As with the mental illness delisting, efforts at law reform in this area can
be successful only if the negative “facts” about gay parents are denaturalized and
discredited.
Yet, as a third point regarding the influence of extrajudicial sources, discrediting
perceived facts about a group is not always sufficient to eradicate legal burdens on group
members. While changes to perceptions of group members’ capacity may help change
normative attitudes as well, this kind of synergistic transformation is not automatic. In
some instances, negative norms are so deeply rooted that they influence adjudication of
social change-based claims even after negative facts about group members are no longer
believable. Courts in these cases let empirical, uncontested facts about group members
stand in silently for norms that justify continuing limitations on group members’ rights in
165

See, e.g., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (John D’Emilio et. Al.
eds., 2000).
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the way that “thick” facts had done before. The “fact” that gay people are less able
parents may no longer be credible to justify the exclusion of gay people from
parenting,166 for example, but the empirical fact of procreative capacity continues to stand
in to preserve the operation of the traditional disapproving norm.167 For as long as
procreative capacity is seen to justify a preference for heterosexuality, courts will find the
marriage exclusion justified.
In this scenario, neither social movements nor social scientists are likely to have a
direct effect on disrupting patterns of negative treatment of social group members.
Because the norm goes unmentioned rather than being advanced explicitly as a decisive
“fact,” it is a more elusive target than normative-factual assertions about group members.
Further, even to the extent the norm’s operation could be isolated, the norm—as norm—
is offered as a social judgment, not a fact. As such, it is not subject to disproof in the way
that facts are; rational, evidentiary-based arguments by definition will not be as effective.
Consequently, social movements are relatively helpless in challenging norms that
silently justify continued burdens on group members after facts supporting those burdens
have been disproved. For similar reasons, social science is most effective at attacking
fact-based perceptions of social groups and far less effective at destabilizing negative
norms that persist in the wake of discredited facts. While both have some ability to
166

See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“The father’s continuous exposure of the child
to his immoral and illicit relationship [with another man] renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a
matter of law.”); Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. 1986) (“It is inconceivable that
[the children] could go into that environment [where the father lived with his male partner], be exposed to
this relationship and not suffer some emotional disturbance, perhaps severe.”) (citation omitted).
167
This reliance on empirical rather than questionable normative facts is also evident in litigation strategy.
For example, in defending New York’s exclusionary marriage law, the City of New York offered
procreation as a justification for the law’s classification yet, at the same time, disavowed the position of
disapproving gay people as parents. As shown earlier, since procreative capacity alone cannot explain the
law’s different treatment of gay and non-gay people, it is difficult to understand the procreation argument
as linked to anything other than a preference for heterosexuals as parents. Yet, for political or other
reasons, the City apparently felt it could not embrace that position. Consequently, it proffered the empirical
facts of procreation to do its unspoken normative work. Appellant’s Brief at 45, Hernandez v. Robles, No.
103434/2004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t filed June 27, 2005).
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disrupt the norms associated with uncontested facts about group members, the diffuse
operation of those norms and their lesser susceptibility to rational argument renders the
effect of those efforts far less predictable. Thus, challenges to the norms associated with
empirical facts may be understood best as a second-order task of social movements or
social scientists, for these attacks can begin to gain traction only if normative facts are
displaced first.

V. Theorizing Judicial Norm Avoidance
This Part considers the pragmatic and theoretical conditions that lead courts to
respond to social change as a factual phenomenon before recognizing changes to norms.
It looks, in other words, at why the pressure for constitutional tipping on issues related to
social groups is located in perceptions of facts about group members rather than in
perceptions of evolving norms.
Legal process theories, with their focus on courts’ limited capacity to gather
information related to changing social norms and on their tenuous legitimacy relative to
majoritarian bodies, offer one frame for understanding the judicial response to social
change claims.168 Result-oriented legal realist theories offer another, with their claim that
opinions are best understood as improvisations of a court aimed to obscure or legitimate
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See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (explaining that, under legal process theory, “the
particular task of courts . . . is to decide cases on the basis of reasoned argument, and only issues that can
be resolved by that approach are appropriate for judicial resolution. When courts go beyond this role, they
endanger their legitimacy as legal institutions—first, because they assert an unjustifiable claim to political
superiority, and second, because they act beyond their area of competence.”); see also G. Edward White,
The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 PENN. L. REV. 1212, 1247-49 (1976) (discussing development of
legal process theory).
Critiques of the legal process paradigm have spawned more elaborate and nuanced analysis of the
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches. See, e.g., Rubin, supra; Michael C. Dorf, Legal
Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 895-96, 925-35 (2003).
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an outcome that is largely unrelated to the stated reasoning.169 Socio-psychological
theories suggest that all human beings, including judges, process change first through
factual perceptions and can see normative shifts only later. The discussion below
evaluates and refines the application of these theories in the context of social changebased claims and advances, in addition, a theory suggesting that fact-based adjudication
preserves institutional interests in maximizing flexibility in decision-making. Remaining
questions regarding the legitimacy of fact-based analysis relative to other approaches to
adjudication will be taken up in Part VI.
A. Legal Process Justifications for Fact-Based Adjudication: The Influence
of Concerns With Judicial Legitimacy and Institutional Capacity
If we assume, arguendo, that courts approach adjudication with genuine concern
for their legitimacy (either in the eyes of the general public or their elite peers) and with
recognition of their limited capacity, their preference for fact-based decision-making
appears to be a sensible, conservative, reputation-protecting strategy for several reasons.
First, the very project of identifying norms (and changes to those norms) has an
intangible, almost anthropological quality to it as compared to the project of fact
identification. Because a norm signifies a societal judgment, determining a norm’s
contours requires delving into the inner life of a community, a task for which courts are
notoriously ill-suited from a legal process perspective.170 Not surprisingly, then, when
courts talk about norms, they typically transform the inquiry from an abstract gauging of
169

See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977);
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1993). Not
all of these statements are critical of the underlying judgment. See, e.g., Black, supra note 91, at 430
(offering alternate explanation for result reached in Brown).
170
Justice Scalia made much of this judicial capacity issue in his Roper dissent. See Roper v. Simmons,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1222 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 182-184.
The rise of juries could be said to reinforce this point, to the extent that juries are understood to
bring into the judicial process a more accurate sense of community norms than judges might bring to bear.
On the other hand, the decline of juries might be read to suggest that courts have become more adept at
assessing norms. See generally WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S
ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001).
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social sensibilities to a fact-finding project based on legislation, judicial opinions, and, on
occasion, polling data and reports from expert organizations. Absent consensus on the
meaning of this information, however, the difficult normative choices inherent in
declaring norms are inescapable and, often, not easily defended. Although deciding
which data are credible as an empirical matter requires only thin agreement, determining
which empirical “evidence” should be included (e.g. do opinion polls count?) and how
best to interpret whatever evidence makes the cut is not automatic. Declaring norms thus
leaves courts vulnerable to accusations that they have mistaken their own views for those
of the majority.
Sifting among facts and treating selected facts as decisive does not fully escape
these sorts of problems. Still, fact-based decision-making enables courts to take account
of societal change while maintaining the appearance, superficially at least, of being less
subject to manipulation based on the preferences of individual adjudicators. In part, this
is because the norms for which those facts stand in typically remain unmentioned.
Moreover, facts are relatively more obvious, more measurable, and more subject to proof
than norms. If the observable evidence belies the normative fact that children of
interracial couples are incapable of reproducing, for example, that reproductive “fact”
will be destabilized and a court will have to embrace that change or risk its credibility as
a fact-finder.171 Concerns with legitimacy thus prevent courts from retaining a picture of
171

A recent case assessing the scope of maritime jurisdiction, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. 385
(2004), illustrates this point in a different context. At issue was whether maritime jurisdiction would
encompass the “‘new era’” of technological change in cargo container transportation. Id. at 394 (internal
citation omitted).
While it may once have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying
commercial obligations between the “tackles” (i.e., from port to port) have maritime
objectives, the shore is now an artificial place to draw a line. Maritime commerce has
evolved along with the nature of transportation and is often inseparable from some landbased obligations.
Id. at 394. We might guess at the nature of the norms that enabled the Court to move from one vision of
maritime jurisdiction to another—perhaps it was a commitment to realism over formalism or a Swift v.
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a social group substantially different from the one that is known broadly, even if that
picture is a longstanding one and the subject of the “new” facts is unpopular in the
surrounding society.172
The difficulty for a court in declaring norms, as opposed to facts, is well
illustrated by two recent death penalty cases, in which the majority’s measure of this
country’s “evolving standards of decency”—i.e., social norms—was hotly contested. 173
As these cases show, while agreement could be reached relatively easily regarding the
content of “thin” facts that reflected popular views about the permissibility of the death
penalty’s application to people with mental retardation or juveniles—i.e., the “objective
indicia of consensus” such as “the enactments of legislatures,”174 determination of those

Tyson-like judgment that the nation would benefit from broadening the reach of federal law in this area.
For our purposes here, though, the specific norm or norms that guided understandings of the fact of the
changed technology is unimportant; what matters is that, to the Court, the norms did not require mention as
part of its decision to abandon one set of facts for another.
172
This observation may have only limited value outside the context of facts related to social groups. For
example, many of the facts on which evidence law is based have been shown to be incorrect, yet the law’s
dissonance with reality continues to be tolerated relatively easily. See, e.g., Bryan A. Lang, Shortcuts to
“Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 259 (1998) (observing
that “none of the considerations” that support the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule “rest on
any relevant empirical evidence or study of the matter”). However, factually inaccurate assumptions of
evidence law are far less likely to be known by the general public, and, therefore, less likely to raise doubts
about judicial capacity than similarly incorrect characterizations of social groups.
In addition, if a community remained invested deeply in a traditional normative fact, a court would
not necessarily be compelled to embrace the “new” knowledge even if it persuasively destabilized the old
“fact.” In this respect, courts have discretion either to embrace change, which they can do credibly by
highlighting empirical evidence that discredits the old fact, or ignore “new” evidence and embrace the fact
that is popular in the surrounding community. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), might be said to
reflect the latter option. In sustaining Virginia’s antimiscegenation law, the Virginia Supreme Court
acknowledged the California Supreme Court’s observation in Perez that interracial marriage “could not be
considered vitally detrimental to public health and morals.” Id. at 753 (citing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d
17, 31 (Cal. 1948)). It rejected that view, however, and embraced instead the fact that interracial marriage
would produce a “mongrel breed of citizens,” linking its validation of Virginia’s antimiscegenation law to
historical fact: “[H]istory teach[es] that nations and races have better advanced in human progress when
they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture and developed their own peculiar genius.”
Id. at 756.
173
Eighth Amendment doctrine commands the Court to identify the social norms, in the form of decency
standards, against which particular applications of the death penalty must be weighed. See Roper, 125 S.
Ct. at 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); see also id. at 1191 (discussing “[t]he
inquiry into our society’s evolving standards of decency”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (same).
174
Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. The Court has described this statutory source as “[t]he clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
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facts’ social meaning was anything but uncomplicated.175
In Roper v. Simmons, most recently, the majority found that “objective indicia”
demonstrated “national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles”176 based on,
inter alia, state legislatures’ abolition of the juvenile death penalty, “the infrequency of
[the penalty’s] use even where it remain[ed] on the books; and the consistency in the
trend toward abolition of the practice.”177 The Court found, too, that social science
evidence of juveniles’ “diminished culpability” relative to adults reinforced this
position.178
According to Justice O’Connor’s dissent, however, the same facts “fail[ed] to
demonstrate conclusively that any [genuine national] consensus has emerged” in the
“brief period” since the Court sustained the juvenile death penalty in 1989.179 She
characterized the pace of change as “halting,”180 and found the majority’s analysis
regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders to “def[y] common sense.”181 Justice
Scalia, also dissenting, declared the majority’s identification of norm change based on
changed empirical facts to be “implausible,”182 especially given “the fact that a number of
legislatures and voters have expressly affirmed their support for capital punishment of

Disagreement, unrelated to the point here, exists as to whether and to what extent judges should consider
their own judgment as well. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s view
that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eight Amendment.”) (internal punctuation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
175
For example, norms, not facts, would dictate whether evidence of differences in decision-making
capacity of people with mental retardation and juveniles should be accorded legal salience. Further, norms
would determine whether and how information about international norms should be factored into the
analysis.
176
Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1192. These indicia, the Court found, “provide sufficient evidence that today
our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’” Id. at 1194
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
177
Id. at 1194.
178
Id. at 1196.
179
Id. at 1206 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
180
Id. at 1211.
181
Id. at 1214.
182
Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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16- and 17-year old offenders” since the Court’s earlier ruling on the issue.183 He, like
Justice O’Connor, accused the Court of giving meaning to empirical facts based on
personal preferences: “[A]ll the court has done today . . . is to look over the heads of the
crowd and pick out its friends.”184
A similar split erupted in Atkins v. Virginia.185 For the Atkins majority, the
“consensus reflected in [the] deliberations” of “the American public, legislators, scholars,
and judges” was against imposition of the death penalty on people with mental
retardation.186 Justice Scalia, in dissent, declared the majority’s identification of a norm
based on those sources to be “empty talk,”187 and charged that the majority had relied on
its “feelings and intuition” to give meaning to these facts.188
The sharp dispute over how to glean norms from facts highlights the amorphous,
contestable nature of norms relative to facts. This difference means not only that courts
are particularly vulnerable in declaring norms but also that, conceptually, facts are easier
to discredit than norms. Norms, as judgments, are simply not subject to the same kinds
of testing and verification as facts, whether those facts are “thick” or “thin.” As a result,
demonstrating a court’s flawed reliance on an outdated norm is difficult, at best. Not
surprisingly, then, courts experience more pressure to reject discredited facts (which will
typically be “thick” facts, as “thin” facts are less likely to undergo change) and to steer
clear of overtly selecting among contested norms wherever possible.
183

Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1223. See also Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11
(criticizing the majority’s conclusion that international norms almost universally oppose application of the
death penalty to juveniles).
185
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
186
Id. at 316, 307. The Court also pointed to social science evidence to conclude that people with mental
retardation have diminished culpability. Id. at 318-19 & nn. 23 & 24. (“Their deficiencies . . . diminish
their personal culpability.”).
187
Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188
Id. (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, focused criticism on the majority’s
reliance on “international opinion, the views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls
not demonstrated to be reliable.” Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184
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In addition to the relatively high exposure of facts and the relative difficulty of
discerning norms, risks related to judicial legitimacy incentivize courts to focus on facts
and avoid evaluating norms. Should a court affirm a norm as a justification for
government’s limiting a social group’s rights, it could appear to be inappropriately
substituting categorical acceptance of majoritarian preferences for its own judicial
review. If, on the other hand, a court rejects the dominant norm, it might appear to be
substituting its own normative views for those of the people, a disfavored
countermajoritarian move. In this light, fact-based decision-making appears to offer a
convenient escape from these two undesirable options.
This institutional constraint-based theory seems, on its face, to provide a neat
explanation for fact-based decision-making—courts are likely to be less vulnerable to
criticism of overstepping if they make decisions based on relatively uncontested facts and
avoid staking out positions among competing norms. On the other hand, however, factbased adjudication has not protected courts from controversy regarding the limits of
judicial power. It is hard to imagine that the criticism of the Supreme Court’s
interventions in contested social arenas as in Brown, Romer, and Grutter would have
been significantly different had the Court been more open about the normative
underpinnings of its decisions. To the extent the public pays attention to the Supreme
Court’s actions, it reacts to holdings, not reasoning.189 Likewise, the focus on facts has
not prevented academics and lawyers, as well as peers in the judiciary, from identifying
and criticizing decisions’ normative underpinnings and implications either in scholarly
publications, trade publications or dissenting opinions.

189

John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Court in High Regard, 77 JUDICATURE
273 (1994), cited in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008,
2028-30 (2002).
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Even if fact-based decision-making is dubious as a strategy for preserving judicial
legitimacy, the difficulties associated with norm identification arguably trigger real
concerns regarding institutional capacity that could explain courts’ orientation toward
fact-based decision making. Yet this argument is also less than fully convincing—there
is no admission in the Eighth Amendment cases, for example, that norms of decency are
difficult to identify. Even the dissents in Roper and Atkins, which excoriate the
majority’s norm identification, do not suggest that discerning norms from facts is difficult
but only that the majority erred in doing so. Further, there is no shortage of cases in
which courts declare norms and treat them as decisive, as shown above.190 The judicial
dynamic by which fact-based decisions precede norm declarations illustrates a preference
for delaying the normative analysis but not for avoiding it altogether. There is nothing in
the cases, in other words, suggesting that courts sense themselves to be fundamentally
constrained from identifying norms because of capacity limitations.
B. Legal Realist Explanations for Fact-Based Adjudication
Perhaps fact-based decision-making should be seen as without significance, then,
beyond its function to mask judges’ penchant for manipulating the adjudication process
to reach preferred results. After all, to the extent that fact-based decisions are more
defensible than norm declarations for the reasons discussed above, they provide better
cover for judges’ underlying interests in outcome. On the other hand, though, the coverup theory is inadequate for the same reasons the legitimacy and capacity arguments are
not fully satisfactory. To the extent the public pays attention to judicial action, it is
looking to outcomes, not opinions. The legal elite likewise suspects ideological

190

See supra Part II.

55
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

motivation on the part of many judges.191 Deployment of careful rhetoric does not
alleviate that concern and, in fact, may heighten criticism of judicial dishonesty.
This is not to suggest that either institutional constraints or results-orientation
have no effect on adjudicators. Surely it is true that, at times, fact-based decisions will be
less likely to trigger criticism, or at least less likely to trigger as much criticism—either
from the public or the bar—than overtly normative decisions. But given that neither
theory fully resolves our inquiry, several others warrant consideration.
C. Implications of Social Psychology and Cognitive Science for
Understanding Judicial Responses to Social Change
Quite possibly, the judicial reaction to changing views of social groups simply
mirrors the way in which the broader public experiences those changes. That is, while
norms inevitably inform attitudes about the status and capacity of group members, they
are often not consciously experienced, particularly as those attitudes begin to change.
Instead, a previously disdained group comes to be seen as more capable than previously
thought based on group members’ workforce participation, artistic accomplishments, or
other activities. Only later does the normative overlay of the earlier-held views regarding
group members become apparent. In this light, fact-based intervention neither reflects
institutional constraints nor masks result-orientation but instead reflects the way in which
human beings, including judges, change their views about social groups.192
This theory, which can also be taken as a description of how norms move from a
naturalized to a destabilized state,193 goes some way toward explaining how courts can
rely on facts to reject previously accepted norms regarding social group members’ rights
191

See, e.g., BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); A BADLY
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).
192
See generally Krieger, supra note 158; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
193
See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
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and leave unacknowledged the normative shift implicated by their changed position.
This helps explain, too, some of the ways in which courts seem genuinely unaware of the
normative underpinnings of their decisions, as in the seemingly authentic disbelief of the
majority in Nguyen at being called sexist by the dissent.194
But the “nature of social change” theory, by itself, is also insufficient. Even if the
Nguyen majority could not see that women’s role in childbirth could not automatically
explain the sex-based immigration rule, surely the Court in Brown and Romer, among
other cases, was well aware of those decisions’ normative dimensions and was quite
deliberate in not acknowledging them. What else then, beyond institutional constraints
and the desire for rhetorical cover, might explain the strategic use of facts to intervene in
norm contests regarding social groups?
A related theory would explain fact-based adjudication not solely as an
unconscious method of adaptation to change but rather as reflecting a preference for fact
comparisons as involving a simpler psychological task than norm analysis. Because they
tend to be observable or measurable, facts are relatively easy to compare and contrast.
Norms, on the other hand, because of their amorphous, if not ineffable, nature, are less
than ideal comparators. On this view, the difficulty lies not only in the limited abilities of
courts qua courts to identify norms as opposed to facts but also with the capacity of
human beings to compare facts as opposed to norms. Indeed, that litigation proceeds
194

Although one could argue that the majority was willfully ignoring the dissent’s point, I read the
majority’s response as failing to join issue with the dissent’s claim of sex-based bias because it simply does
not grasp or find credible the dissent’s point. Cf. Anthony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 202 (2005) (“[L]earned patterns prove
remarkably resistant to change. Once the unconscious has detected an initial correlation, a person will
continue to behave as though the correlation exists long after it has disappeared. In many situations, the
person will even behave as though the correlation has strengthened, even in the presence of contradictory
information. This self-perpetuation of the correlation occurs unconsciously, so that a person’s behavior is
the appropriate measure of the correlation’s strength; a person cannot consciously articulate the reasons for
his behavior.”) (footnotes omitted).
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largely as a process of mobilizing facts may be evidence of this theory’s force.
Moreover, even if norms can be identified, reaching agreement on the proper
characterization of a norm (as opposed to a fact) can be daunting. Was the underlying
norm regarding the social group of African Americans as it affected the analysis in
Brown particular to differences between African Americans and whites or was it a
commitment to the irrelevance of racial differences more broadly? To the extent the
norm shift concerned views of African Americans specifically, was the move toward a
view that African Americans and whites were on an equal footing as human beings or
that differences between African Americans and whites existed but were not legally
cognizable? As we know, individual justices held differing views on these and related
questions.195 When we try to understand why the Court avoided a norm declaration in
Brown, for example, we can imagine that the underlying norm for some members of the
Court would Judges that might agree on outcome may have great difficulty cohering
around a specific normative underpinning for that result. This might be thought of as the
“getting to yes” strand of the socio-psychological theory of fact-based adjudication. If it
is relatively easy for judges to reach agreement on fact statements and near-impossible to
agree upon a precise norm, the judicial inclination toward fact-based decisions becomes
all the more understandable.
D. Fact-Based Adjudication in the Service of Institutional Interests:
A Methodology That Preserves Judicial Flexibility
A further reason that courts may avoid declaring changes to social norms relates
more to institutional interests in preserving flexibility than to institutional constraints on
the way judicial power is exercised. Courts that frame a decision as rejecting a norm
rather than as responding to a fact (or a fact change) risk committing themselves to a
195

See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 657-99 (1976).
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broad doctrinal position that limits room to maneuver in later cases. A court might want
to reject a norm in one context, for example, but might not want to risk embracing
rejection of that norm in similar settings. By avoiding all discussion of the norm, the risk
of a stare decisis roadblock is averted or at least minimized.196
A counterfactual may help test this. In Reed v. Reed,197 as discussed above, the
Court never addressed the normative fact of “natural differences” between men and
women that the Idaho Supreme Court held justified the subordination of wives to
husbands in estate administration. What if, instead of ignoring the Idaho court’s
rationale, the U.S. Supreme Court had unraveled norm from fact and rejected the natural
domesticity norm as impermissible? In addition to the risk of being charged with
inappropriately and ineptly intervening in a cultural debate, the Court potentially would
have disabled use of “natural” sex differences to justify government action in other cases.
This is a position the Court was, and remains, unwilling to take.198 Rejecting the
traditional judgment about women’s natural inclinations, in other words, would have
gone too far doctrinally, in addition to the myriad legal process-type problems it might
have generated.
Perhaps, then, the court could have limited its rejection of “natural differences” to
the context at issue. Instead of focusing on the empirical justification’s inadequacy, the
court might have held that judgments about “natural sex differences” did not support sexbased estate administration rules. But recognizing the norm shift even in this narrow way
would have been riskier than the Court’s empirically-focused analysis because the
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The literature on judicial minimalism illustrates the existence of this approach, see, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 25, but does not explore the particular incentives courts have to make minimalist decisions in the
context considered here.
197
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
198
See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
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concession of normative change begs the questions whether any sex-based distinction in
treatment could be justified by “natural” differences and, if so, how?199 By not
acknowledging its rejection of the norm, the court enabled itself and lower courts to
sidestep more easily the resurfacing of “natural” differences in other cases.
Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent, highlighted the ways in which
explicit rejection of norms about social groups constrains future decision-making. There,
he castigated the majority and the concurrence for assuming they could reject the norm of
gay people’s immorality as a rationale for Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law but then
accept the same norm to justify sexual orientation-based distinctions in the military or
marriage.200 “This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one
entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this
Court,” he wrote.201
One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather
than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to
their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation of
homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage,
but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and may
legislate accordingly. The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar
199

While the way in which a court articulates its standard for reviewing certain classifications also can be
more or less constraining (i.e., a norm of skepticism via heightened scrutiny will be more limiting to future
decision-making than a norm that social group-based distinctions can survive if they are reasonable), my
focus here is on whether courts constrain themselves by the way they evaluate government interests,
whatever the applicable standard of review. As we have seen, whether under heightened or rational basis
review, the Court has tended toward fact-based decisions whenever a particular normative judgment about
a social group appeared to be in contest and, even under the highest levels of review, government reliance
on the protected trait sometimes is sustained. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Further, for
example, as Justice Scalia pointed out, infra text at notes 200-202, the explicit rejection of the moral
disapproval norm in Lawrence will make it far more difficult for the Court to resuscitate that norm to
sustain a sexual orientation-based distinction in a future case, notwithstanding that rational basis review
may be applied. While we may see efforts to cabin Lawrence and reassert acceptance of the moral
disapproval norm, my guess is that we are more likely to see decisions relying either on other normative
judgments about gay people or on fact-based distinctions, such as those related to the procreative capacity
of same- and different-sex couples. The recent opinions by state courts in marriage cases bear this out,
with morality left largely unmentioned while procreative facts and normative support for tradition serving
as widely accepted justifications. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text and infra notes 218-219
and accompanying text.
200
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589-90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201
Id. at 605.
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freedom of action[.]202
In contrast to majoritarian bodies, which can pick and choose among norms, courts, as
Justice Scalia suggested, have significantly less flexibility. Once a general norm has
been rejected in one context, it is difficult, at best, to resuscitate that norm in a related
case.
In some respects, this institutional interests theory accounts most broadly for factbased adjudication of social change claims. Its explanatory value does not depend on
courts being conscious of the normative positions implicated by their opinions; courts
making fact-based decisions might either be unsure of how to articulate the normative
shift or, conceivably, unaware of the normative position their opinions reflect, as in cases
where norms remain deeply naturalized. The interest in minimizing restrictions on future
exercises of judicial power likewise serves interests of outcome-oriented judges as much
as it serves those who perceive themselves as constrained by judicial capacity and
legitimacy concerns.
The operation of fact-based adjudication and the institutional interests theory that
helps explain the judicial preference for facts over norms thus adds a new layer to our
understanding of judicial review. Typically, legal process, legal realist, and cognitive
psychological approaches to adjudication are seen as having little in common. To the
extent they are all operationalized via fact-based adjudication, however, their shared
instinct toward preservation of future decision-making authority becomes legible.
The institutional interests theory has several potential weaknesses that bear
consideration. For one, it fails to explain why courts would ever declare norms if to do
so is power-restricting. One also could argue, in a different vein, that norm declarations

202

Id. at 604.
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are not as restrictive of future exercises of judicial power as the theory suggests. The
Supreme Court has regularly rejected a normative preference for equality, for example,
on the grounds that the facts require a different analysis.203 Conversely, one could argue
that fact-based decision-making are power-limiting more than power-preserving because
they can be read more narrowly than norm declarations.
As to the first point, we might resuscitate the theory by distilling its essence,
which is confirmed by the descriptive analysis above — that although courts may reach a
point of comfort with norm declarations, the judicial instinct upon entering new
normative terrain is to drop a relatively light anchor that allows for ease of movement in
the future. Only later, once the terrain is better know through the accretion of fact-based
decisions, is greater security regarding the selected position likely to arise. At that point,
but not before, courts may find sufficient comfort to drop the heavier anchor in the form
of stating the underlying norm.
The fact that some limited future drifting may occur in the form of decisions that
reject application of the declared norm to a given case does not diminish the generally
constraining effects of norm-declarative cases, which must be distinguished on the
grounds that the principle does not carry over to the new facts. Fact-based decisions, on
the hand, can be distinguished without reference either to principle or norm, leaving far
more room for courts to maneuver in the future.
While the engendering of greater room for maneuver certainly can be read as
reflecting an inclination to limit rather than preserve power, as the third objection
suggests, I believe the power-preservative reading is more accurate in the context of
social group cases. The reason, drawing from the descriptive discussion above, is that
203

See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (distinguishing restrictions
on gay people in marriage and the military from restrictions related to sexual intimacy).
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fact-based decisions have the effect of enshrining or endorsing a particular norm
regarding a social group but without the concomitant pressure to defend or reconcile the
retention of traditional views in one case with the rejection of similar views in another.
In other words, while fact-based decisions might appear to be narrower, that appearance
rests on the fiction that judicial decisions do not embody normative judgments and have
no effect on the popular norm debate.

VI. The Legitimacy of Fact-Based Adjudication: Would Candor Be Better?
With the above description and theory of fact-based adjudication in mind, this
final section considers whether greater candor regarding the normative judgments
implicated in adjudication would be preferable to the current focus on facts. What would
be gained – and lost – by consistent exposure of the normative positions regarding social
groups in constitutional adjudication?
In the literature on judicial candor, several general positions have been staked out.
At one end is the argument that candor is always, or almost always, preferable. From this
perspective, obscuring the “real” reason for decisions is disagreeable as a matter of
general principle and potentially dangerous to the stability and credibility of courts if
accepted as a matter of institutional design.204 On the other end is the argument that
candor, in the sense of introspection by judges regarding the genuine reasons for their
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See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 251-52 (1964) (describing
“a reputation for candor” as the Supreme Court’s “precious political asset”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307
(1995); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); David L.
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, Judicial
Candor]; Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721 (1979). Cf. CALABRESI,
supra note 8 (advocating candor but acknowledging that judges experience different constraints than
scholars); Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to
Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 155-60 (2006) (discussing literature on judicial candor within broader analysis of
courts’ adjudicative responsibilities).

63
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

decisions, actually might harm the judicial process by weakening judges’ internalized
sense of obligation to follow rules rather than exercise unconstrained discretion.205 In
between are pragmatic, instrumental arguments suggesting that political and other
constraints render candor, even if desirable, an unrealistic aim.206
Before assessing the potential value of increased candor in connection with social
group litigation, two preliminary points require attention. First, I assume that even if
norms cannot be described as precisely as facts, it is possible, in virtually all cases, to
articulate some aspect of the governing norm. Indeed, given the frequent efforts in
dissenting opinions to expose and criticize the norms allegedly ignored by the majority,
the hurdle of norm identification does not seem insuperable as a practical matter, even if
it is a difficult task for reasons addressed above.207
The second concerns the meaning of candor. Although the literature defines
candor in multiple ways, a consistent thread is a focus on “the declarant’s state of
mind.”208 Much of the literature deems a candor requirement to be satisfied if a judge
does not intend to deceive others; self-deception is treated as a separate issue.209 For
purposes here, I take a view of candor that extends beyond avoidance of deliberate
deception and includes an expectation that courts identify and articulate the normative
underpinnings of their decisions. Through this approach, I mean to reach cases in which
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See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Candor of
Justice Marshall, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 83 (1989); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist:
Statues and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 249-57 (1983). But see Gail Heriot, Way
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991) (critiquing Altman’s arguments).
206
See Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 204, at 742.
207
See supra Part V.C.
208
Id. at 732.
209
See Altman, supra note 205, at 297 (suggesting a distinction between candid, meaning “never being
consciously duplicitous” and introspective, meaning “critically examining one’s mental states to avoid any
self-deception or error”); Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 204, at 732 (excluding self-deception from
an analysis of the value of judicial candor). Earlier literature, such as that of the legal realists, treated the
two as more closely aligned. See Altman, supra note 205, at 297-98 (“The realists urged judges to
recognize and to disclose the motivations that the judges deny . . . .”).
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norms are deeply naturalized and seen as inseparable from fact, as in decisions based on
the “natural” ordering of race or sex, as well as decisions in which courts deliberately
avoid addressing norms. In this way, I can test more fully the consequences of displacing
the fact-based adjudication fiction with a more transparent approach to decision-making
in social group cases.
What might be gained, then, from increased pressure on courts to acknowledge
expressly the normative grounds for their opinions in social change cases? Leaving aside
general moral preferences for honesty,210 several possible benefits come to mind. First,
we might conclude that greater transparency regarding decisions’ normative
underpinnings would pressure courts to account for dissonant positions regarding a social
group rather sidestep stare decisis constraints by sweeping inconsistencies under a factual
cover. Under this approach, we would expect to see decisions that are more fully
theorized.
Second, it might be that, if forced to expose their normative positions, some
courts would decide cases differently. Greater transparency, in other words, might
function as a partial limit to judges’ otherwise relatively unconstrained exercise of resultoriented preferences. Of course, one can always argue that courts will offer what they
perceive to be “acceptable” norms to justify decisions that are actually driven by
“unacceptable” motives. But in some cases, the task of drumming up a passable norm to
justify burdening a particular social group may be either too difficult or not worth the risk
to judicial credibility. For example, as suggested earlier, had the Court in Nguyen been
pressured to identify the norm that linked the empirical fact of childbirth to a rule that
presumed women were more likely to nurture their children than men, it might have
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Cf. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1978).
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hesitated to take that strongly contested position.
Third, we might conclude that greater openness regarding normative motivation
would be desirable from the vantage point of social change advocates. Even if litigation
resulted in losses for a social group, the justificatory rationales would have to be stated
clearly in contrast to the current practice, which permits empirical facts to stand in for
negative norms even after these norms have been discredited as resting on inaccurate
assumptions about group members. The clarity that would flow from a candor
requirement might enable future challenges to be more focused and, potentially, more
successful.
On the other hand, several consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments
call attention to the double-edged nature of transparency and suggest that candor may not
be desirable, either practically or theoretically. Social movements, for example, are in a
relatively stronger position to debunk erroneous traditional facts about group members
than to disprove norms, as discussed earlier, since norms are not falsifiable in the way
that facts typically are.211 Social science analysis likewise can be deployed against
factual mischaracterizations of groups but is far less effective in challenging norms.
Thus, if decisions turn on facts rather than norms, advocates for social change have
greater opportunity to offer definitive, or at least more powerful, critiques than if
decisions turn overtly on norms.212
In addition, as noted above, reaching consensus on the specifics of a governing
norm regarding a social group whose status is in flux may not be possible either because
of substantive or rhetorical disagreement regarding the characterization of the norm.
211

See supra text accompanying note 172.
An additional risk for advocates of social change is that a court’s explicit identification and approval of
a negative norm about group members will reify and strengthen the norm to a greater extent than a decision
that affirms the norm implicitly.
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Consequently, a court poised to rule for a social group in a fact-based decision that elides
these difficulties might opt to sustain the status quo if norm identification is required.
While most social movements would likely prefer decisions that overtly reject negative
norms about the group, those same movements will typically prefer victory to outright
loss, even if the victory takes the narrower form of a fact-based ruling.
Further, and perhaps more importantly from an institutional design standpoint,
fact-based decisions may, through their lack of overt norm declaration, encourage
extrajudicial conversation among other governmental institutions and the general public
regarding norm selection and revision. Judicial declarations, by contrast, are likely to
limit the scope of future legislative activity213 and the effectiveness of social science and
social movements on the public’s views of social groups.
Simply put, norm declaration closes doors more definitively than norm avoidance.
Much like common law decisions are more easily adjustable than constitutional
decisions, even though those also are not fixed absolutely, fact-based decisions allow
greater room for future movement than norm-based decisions. In this way, when making
fact-based decisions, particularly in contested normative arenas, courts leave open the
possibility that norms will emerge with greater clarity from other, more representative
bodies.
Related to this point is the idea that, as a society, our commitment to pluralism
extends to pluralism about norms.214 From this vantage point, a certain amount of
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Judicial affirmation of a traditional norm raises political risks for a majoritarian legislature that is
inclined to reject that norm. Advocates for the traditional norm will be strengthened in their claim that the
legislature has acted based on personal preferences rather than to reflect the majority’s will. Likewise,
legislative rejection of a traditional norm may spark legal challenges and sharpen public criticism by
adherents of the traditional norm.
214
See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 1466 (describing American democracy as “pluralist in
character” and observing that “responses to racial discrimination in the United States reflect a strong
commitment to the idea of pluralism”); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
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muddiness related to norms reflects not only the instrumental difficulty with norm
identification but also the normative desirability of preserving and encouraging diverse
perspectives on social groups and most other topics. Pressure for normative clarity, even
in adjudication, thus would run contrary to overarching political and jurisprudential
commitments.
While these arguments against an outright candor requirement are generally
persuasive for the reasons just discussed, they are also incomplete.215 Even if the fiction
that courts can avoid making normative judgments warrants acceptance most of the time,
it appears to be exploited to excess on occasion in ways the arguments fail to justify. My
specific concern is with decisions that depend on the fiction not only avoid identifying
their normative underpinnings but also to avoid acknowledging and addressing
connections among cases involving related norms. This is not to say that the norm shift
in case 1 must also occur in case 2 involving the same social group but rather that, if the
norm shift is refused in case 2, that determination should be defended overtly.
Of course, insisting on acknowledgment and distinction of decisions resting on
conflicting norms could give rise to the same problems for social groups seeking change
discussed above. In particular, pressure on courts to address overtly differing views
regarding a social group might lead courts to affirm traditional norms in all instances
rather than enabling a patchwork of positions. Alternately, if a judge remains willing to
risk the appearance of inconsistency and reject traditional norms in some settings but

Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 373 n.529 (1992) (linking
“America’s vibrant cultural pluralism” to “core principles of representative government”).
215
The position impels important questions about whether adjudication that avoids full disclosure and
defense of underlying normative choices should ever be tolerated and, further, about the scope and extent
of candor that should be expected of judges that are sensitive to the role of norms in their decision-making.
In the interests of focusing on the problem at hand, I will set aside the broadest iterations of these questions
and concentrate here on their application in the context of claims that courts should integrate societal
change.
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accept them in others, overt affirmation of a traditional norm, even if limited to a
particular context, could breathe new life into a restrictive view of social group members’
capacity in a way that a fact-based elision would not.
Moreover, the task of articulating the normative (as opposed to factual) reasons
why a social group can be treated equally in one setting yet unequally in another simply
may be too difficult a task for courts for all of the reasons discussed above regarding the
challenges of norm identification. Further, even if courts are competent enough to do
this, the requirement may be so unrelated to the actual way in which judges adjudicate
difficult social group cases as to have little effect on the actual decision-making process.
If a judge relies on Karl Llewellyn’s situation sense216 to distinguish one setting from
another, for example, rather than a more intellectually rigorous analytic process,
insistence on engagement with conflict norms may alter the text of a decision but not the
underlying reasoning.
Several of the other reasons advanced above to support fact-based adjudication
have less traction with respect to acknowledgment of divergent norms, however. The
embrace of pluralism would not, at least in theory, be hindered by the expectation that
reliance on differing views regarding the same social group be addressed expressly. To
the contrary, the overt defense of pluralistic viewpoints regarding a social group could be
seen as reflecting and fostering broader commitments to diversity. Further, to the extent
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That sense, although not defined specifically in Llewellyn’s own work, has been well described as a
“‘process of thinking’ that considers ‘the implications of various legal rules, matched up against
reasonably intricate models of social situations, and brought together in light of the force of all the claims
to be made.” Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation An Introduction to the Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 129, 293 n.573 (2003)
(emphasis supplied), quoting Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts Of “Default Rules” and
“Situation Sense,” in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW at 191, 214 (Jack Beatson & Daniel
Friedmann, eds., 1995). On Llewellyn’s situation sense, see also Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 307, 393 n.374 (2005); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
842, 842-46 (1999). For an extensive critique, see Hanson & Yosifon, supra, at 293-99.
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courts recognize the validity of competing viewpoints regarding a group, even if in
different contexts, room remains for the public and its representatives to continue to
debate the relative merits of each position in extrajudicial settings.
Because the marriage cases with which this article began illustrate so strikingly
the fiction’s effect of enabling disregard of competing norms, I return to them now to
revisit the operation of fact-based adjudication and to consider the consequences of
limiting that adjudicative fiction in the ways just discussed. In the majority of these
cases, courts have rejected the claims of lesbians and gay men seeking to marry. Most
often, as discussed earlier, they hold that marriage is reserved justifiably for different-sex
couples because those couples can, in theory if not reality, procreate without third party
assistance. Courts often characterize the rationale as reflecting the essence of marriage
rather than as expressing a view about the social group of gay people. When the
procreation rationale is set against the background of marriage case law, however, it
becomes clear that the law of marriage does not now, and has never, treated procreation
as essential.217
Why, then, has procreative capacity emerged as the definitive factual justification
for excluding same-sex couples from marriage? Most of the cases do not offer anything
other than a glib reference to history and/or to traditional views of marriage.218 One court
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Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1089 (2002). Certainly today, economic interdependence is widely acknowledged as the primary function
of civil marriage. Civil marriage has always been an economic relationship between the spouses, although
during coverture, the relationship was less about interdependence than about wives’ legal status merging
into that of their husbands. Emotional interdependence and childrearing are occasionally recognized as
important as well, though far more in the public discourse than in domestic relations jurisprudence.
Procreation, on the other hand, has been specifically disavowed as a marital requirement, as indicated by
the law delineating eligibility for marriage, annulment law, and the constitutional protection for a woman’s
right, even absent her husband’s consent, to terminate a pregnancy. Neither is procreation limited by law
to marriage. Id.
218
On history and tradition as justifications for government action, see, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Tradition
and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of
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has gone further to suggest that marriage is necessary to impose order on heterosexual
procreation, something not needed for same-sex couples whose procreation is necessarily
more deliberate.219
Yet it is somewhat difficult to take seriously, in light of common sense as well as
the legislative framework and case law concerning marriage, the suggestion that egg,
sperm, and gestation are more fundamental to marriage than the lifetime of parenting
responsibilities of the adult partners after childbirth. Indeed, as the fact/norm framework
illustrates, the facts of procreation alone are insufficient as explanations for the sex-based
restriction in marriage law. They are not evaluative or explanatory; a norm must give
meaning to those facts to justify their use to exclude same-sex couples from marriage.
This explanatory deficit is particularly striking since many same-sex couples do
procreate—albeit with third party assistance.220
If we are to understand what is really driving the decisions, then, the exposition of
the fact-based adjudication model above challenges us to identify the norms for which the
biological facts of procreation stand in. Put another way, we must ask what normative
position a court is taking regarding lesbians and gay men as parents if it sustains different
marriage rules for gay and non-gay people on the grounds of procreative capacity. Most
courts have yet to pose these questions, let alone answer them.221 Even if we accept the
lack of candor regarding the norms that give meaning to procreation, however, we also
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
219
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“What does the difference between
‘natural’ reproduction on the one hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other mean for
constitutional purposes? It means that it impacts the State of Indiana’s clear interest in seeing that children
are raised in stable environments. Those persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and
expense associated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able to provide
such an environment, with or without the ‘protections’ of marriage, because of the high level of financial
and emotional commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in the first place.
By contrast, procreation by ‘natural’ reproduction may occur without any thought for the future.”)
220
Of course, many different-sex couples procreate with third-party assistance as well.
221
But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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must ask whether courts legitimately can disregard the numerous decisions that are not
troubled by differences in procreative capacity when rejecting distinctions between gay
and non-gay parents. In most of the states in which marriage challenges have been
adjudicated, there is ample case law holding that sexual orientation should not be taken
into account in making custody and visitation decisions absent some showing of harm to
the child.222 These cases embody and often express directly a normative judgment about
the relative equality of gay and non-gay parents. A court wishing to treat gay and nongay parents as normatively unequal in the marriage context potentially could still do so,
perhaps on the ground that the cases embracing contrary norms reflect individualized
determinations about parenting rather than broad policy judgments.223 Complete failure
to wrestle with the dissonant normative position in these cases, however, amounts not
only to a lack of candor but also, arguably, to a kind of duplicity through the deliberate
disregard of related precedent.224
Conceivably, even with strong precedent rejecting legal distinctions between gay
and non-gay parents, courts might rest their decisions to uphold a discriminatory
marriage law on a desire to avoid displacing the people’s representatives on a contested
issue. But the analysis of fact-based adjudication above should make us hesitant to
accept this explanation.
For one, any decision—including a decision to sustain the status quo—reflects a
222

See Patricia M. Logue, The Facts of Life for Gay and Lesbian Parents, 25 FAM. ADVOC. 43, 44 (2002)
(“The overwhelming trend in custody and visitation cases is not to attach negative presumptions about
parenting or conduct to a parent’s sexual orientation, but to look at whether there is any evidence of harm
to children. . . . A clear majority of states takes this approach. In recent years, even states generally
considered socially conservative on issues of homosexuality and parenting have disclaimed any per-se rule
restricting custody for lesbian or gay parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone.”).
223
I would disagree with this distinction in that decisions on these issues announce principles to be applied
beyond the case at bar, but will leave my disagreement at that, for now.
224
I take this position cognizant of Karl Llewellyn’s point that a determined court can distinguish
precedent in a variety of ways. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960). Llewellyn assumes, for the most part, that precedent will be distinguished, not ignored. Forcing
that exposure on a consistent basis is a check, even if an imperfect one, against judicial duplicity.
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selection among competing norms regarding the social group of gay people, as shown
earlier. Second, the profession that the plaintiffs’ challenge must be rejected out of
deference to the legislature disregards that the legislature typically has spoken to the
issue before the court, which is the legitimacy of retaining different rules for gay and
non-gay adults in the context of marriage. Domestic relations law in states across the
country makes clear, as noted earlier, that a couple’s capacity to procreate without
assistance is neither necessary nor sufficient as a marriage qualification.
But there is more than that. The legislatures in most states where marriage
litigation is taking place also have expressed normative judgments about the difference
(or lack thereof) between gay and non-gay parents through legislative frameworks
regarding adoption, foster care, guardianship and other mechanisms related to parenting
and adult care for children. If the state’s view is that gay people do not make as good
parents as non-gay people, surely that would be reflected in the law concerning children
who are wards of the state.225 If the state’s view is that couples capable of procreating
without assistance make better parents than other couples, we would expect that, too, to
be reflected in these laws. But such prohibitions exist as outliers, if at all.226 Even
further, courts in many of these states have authorized second-parent adoptions so that
both parents in a same-sex couple can establish a legal relationship with the child(ren)
they are raising. Yet in none of these states has the legislature acted to overturn a secondparent adoption ruling on the ground that same-sex couples should not be encouraged to
225

See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Svcs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004)
(sustaining Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbian and gay adults), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). For a critique of the 11th Circuit’s decision in Lofton,
see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit: On Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of
Children, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421 (2005).
We might also expect to see prohibitions on gay adults serving as role models for children,
whether as teachers, coaches or leaders of youth organizations yet no state has in place anything of the
kind.
226
See Strasser, supra note 225.
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parent.
In this context, the risk for social group advocates that pressure for overt
acknowledgment of competing norms would cause courts to hew to traditional norms in
all other cases involving that group does not seem great. Given the near-universality of
the trend toward removing sexual orientation-based distinction in all areas other than the
military and marriage, a re-articulation of the traditional norm would be unlikely to spark
a reversal. On the other hand, it might dampen ongoing legislative efforts to make
marriage available to same-sex couples by reinforcing traditional hostility toward or
deprecation of gay people in ways that a fact-based resting on the purported link between
procreation and marriage would not.
More broadly, one might object that the federalist system does and should allow
precisely this sort of state-by-state experimentation and that pressure on courts to defend
the acceptance of competing norms would cut against this value. Federal equal
protection law should not prohibit states from embracing divergent public policies, this
argument would urge. The question here, however, is not whether experimentation in the
abstract is permissible or desirable. Instead, it is whether the justification on which a
state relies for its burdensome treatment of the targeted social group has become
impermissible in light of social change, even if the state’s law reflects experimentalist
instincts. Through this lens, judicial review that takes account of societal changes to
normative views of social groups even could be characterized as state-respecting, in that
its cues regarding the continued legitimacy of these views come from the activities of the
states themselves.
The requirement that conflicting norms be exposed and defended should be even
less controversial with respect to state constitutional analysis, given that the restriction on
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a social group could be measured against other treatments of that group intrastate.227
Again, the candor requirement would not mandate a coherent set of norms regarding a
group but rather a legitimate explanation for the continued use of the rights-restricting
norm in some settings but not others.
Justice Scalia would object, as he did in his Lawrence dissent, that by looking to
norms reflected in legislation as well as in judicial precedent, courts would impose an
unduly burdensome requirement that legislatures act on consistent principles rather than
moving incrementally.228 But this concern is not as grave as it might appear. The
argument here is not that courts invalidate legislation unless it is in lockstep with
principles reflected in similar laws.229 Indeed, such a proposal would be futile given that
legislatures typically do not work so coherently, and that laws often reflect a diversity of
norms regarding social groups.230 Also, courts retain the authority to decide whether and
how far to carry a norm from one context to another. Relating one context to another has
long been the essence of judicial practice. The point instead is that the advantage of
flexibility has substantial costs and that those costs warrant consideration as we evaluate
the acceptability of fact-based adjudication.
Another objection to a framework requiring acknowledgment of conflicting
norms would be that it inappropriately pressures courts to impose their own views across
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See Kaye, supra note 9, at 16 (recognizing that state courts’ “use of the common law to define rights at
times has been preferable in that it has allowed both courts and legislatures room to adapt principles to
changed circumstances” and observing that federal courts lack “that same flexibility” because of their
limited powers to create common law).
228
See supra text accompanying notes 200-202.
229
Indeed, courts need not look to legislation at all. While legislation, like case law, may provide useful
insight into the settling of norms that are related directly to the rationale being considered by a court, the
candor requirement conceivably could be limited to case law.
230
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 129 (1971) (“I’m
skeptical that a method of forcing articulation of purposes [by legislatures] can be developed that will be
both workable and helpful.”); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222, 23335 (1976) (arguing that the natural of the lawmaking process renders legislative intent difficult to discern).
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all decision-making rather than exercising discretion to leave change in hotly contested
areas to the legislature. The argument would maintain that even if the court has affirmed
non-traditional views of the targeted social group in other settings, courts should
minimize their role on issues that are central to public debate. While this point has plenty
of political force, it too rests on a misconception about the relationship between courts
and legislatures. Because legislation tends to respond more quickly to societal change
than common law or constitutional law, “new” views regarding social groups ordinarily
will be reflected in statutes well before courts begin adjudicating constitutional claims.
Indeed, if all other sexual orientation-based distinctions have been removed from statutes
and case law, their retention in marriage law arguably has occurred because it is not
politically tenable for the legislature to clean up the last vestiges of longstanding hostility
toward the social group at issue.231 Affirming traditional disapproval for gay parents,
therefore, is not a neutral move but instead runs counter to other legislative expression on
the same issue. From this perspective, courts seem particularly well-suited, as enforcers
of equal protection and other constitutional guarantees, to identify the occurrence of
process failure and correct its consequences.
Of course, it is also possible that the exclusionary law’s survival in the face of
other changes demonstrates not that process failure has occurred but rather than the
interaction of marriage and same-sex couples is somehow different from all other law
related to sexual orientation. But if that is the claim, it ought to be defended. To the
extent the contemporary approach of fact-based adjudication safeguards courts from that
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See ELY, supra note 230. Consider, for example, the refusal of some legislatures to repeal sodomy
prohibitions even after judicial invalidation. See, e.g., Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited:
A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 857, 894 (1996) (noting that “in 1980, the New York Court of Appeals declared [New York’s law
criminalizing non-commercial sexual conduct between consenting adults] unconstitutional as a violation of
the right to privacy in People v. Onofre. To date, the statute remains on the books.”) (citation omitted).
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pressure to defend, it presents not merely a pragmatic mode of analysis but also a cover
for result-oriented decision-making that should be removed.

VII. Conclusion
Wherever one comes out on the ultimate question of how much account courts
should take of societal change, the constant involvement of courts in assessing social
norms cannot reasonably be ignored. Courts evaluate and select among competing norms
related to the status and capacity of social groups on a regular basis, even when those
norms are contested and even when their normative choices go unacknowledged.
Consequently, the presumption made by many courts, elected officials and commentators
that courts avoid influencing norm contests when they reject social change-based claims
is misconceived. It is the fiction of fact-based adjudication, not a unique aptitude of
courts to make decisions without normative choices, that enables judgments to be made
without mention of norms. Our theories of judicial review will be better off, both with
respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the extent they embrace, rather than
overlook, this reality.
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